


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EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

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
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THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN THIS WORLD

By WILLIAM E. WILSON

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The Barthians and an increasing number of younger theologians in Great Britain and America who follow their lead are convinced that the hope of the Kingdom of God is an entirely other-worldly hope, which cannot in any real sense be fulfilled in this world. Here indeed they admit that individuals, and even in a sense the Church as a whole may enter into the Kingdom, but rather as its subjects in an alien land, than as looking forwards to its actual establishment upon earth.

The object of this essay is to inquire whether this denial of hope for this world is founded upon a true understanding of Scripture. Within the limits of space designed for a single article it will not be possible to consider the subject as fully as could be wished. I must therefore confine myself to a general setting forth of the grounds for believing that the Kingdom must come in this world and adducing some of the Scriptural foundations for that belief.

Before coming to grips with the subject one obstacle to clear thinking must be removed. It seems very generally to be assumed that if we hold that the

Kingdom of God must come in this world, we thereby deny the fuller manifestation of it in Heaven Beyond. In other words, it is held that it can come either in this world, or in the World to Come, but not in both. But there is no "Either . . . or" about it. As God is Creator of all, ought not His rule to be established in every part of His universe? Of course Heaven beyond must remain the great hope of Christians. But there is no likelihood that the establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth will lessen men's realization that something greater and more permanent awaits them beyond. It is far more likely to make them realise that they have already begun that life with God, which because it is with the Eternal must last eternally, even when this world has ceased to be. Moreover for everyone of us now alive the hope of Eternal Life Beyond is the more immediate and personal, for it is what we may hope to share in when our brief life here is over. The hope of the Kingdom in this world is rather for generations to come, but is nevertheless vital for us, because by whole-hearted com-

mittal of our lives to God, we may help to bring it about. In this sense it is a more unselfish hope than that for personal Immortality. And it is, as I hope to show, as genuine a part of the message of the New Testament as is Heaven beyond.

I

There has been a great deal of discussion as to the exact meaning of the term "Kingdom of God," into most of which it is not necessary to enter now, but one point seems to be of vital importance for our study, namely the distinction parallel to that which is made in worldly affairs between a King *de jure* and a King *de facto*. The first is a King who has the title to rule, but whose subjects may not accept him as King. The second expresses the fact that he actually rules, that is that his subjects generally are loyal to him. Now, God, because He is the creator is *de jure* ruler of the whole Universe. But on this earth He is not *de facto* King, because His subjects here—mankind in general—are not loyal to Him. No Christian will deny this statement, but two of its implications are often overlooked, and even denied. The first is that, if that be the state of affairs, the phrase "The Coming of the Kingdom of God," familiar in the N.T., would seem of necessity to apply to this earth. It simply does not fit the idea of a rapture of the saints to heaven, where the rule of God is already perfect. "Being taken to the Kingdom of Heaven" would be a more correct expression for the latter. In short, if the Kingdom of God is to come, it must be to come where it is not now, on earth, and to come in actuality, for God is already King *de jure*. In other words, the petition "Thy Kingdom

come" must mean "make men loyal to God." The second point is this, if the Kingdom *de facto* means "Mankind loyal to God," the Kingdom must come by a change in mankind, not alone by an act of God. And this is true in the case of the Kingdom of God in a far fuller sense than it is of any earthly parallel that can be drawn. It is, for example, possible for a rightful earthly ruler to suppress a revolt by force of arms, and so compel grudging submission to his rule; but the whole N.T. is witness that God's requirement of His subjects is no mere exterior obedience, which could go with inner disloyalty, but a devotion springing out of the depths of the personality and working out in the whole of life. It follows then that God's action throughout must be, what it began to be in the prophets and was completely in Christ, an appeal to men to turn to Him and live. Hence also a certain gradualness is essential to the coming of the Kingdom, because it takes time to appeal to all men—and an inordinately long time if God's servants, to whom is committed the message of reconciliation, are slack about doing it, or use methods contrary to the nature of their task.

On the face of it, then, we should expect that the Kingdom of God is destined to come in this world, in the sense that some time mankind as a whole will be loyal servants of God, as well as being fully consummated in Heaven, where it has always existed *de facto*. So we turn to the Scripture testimony on the subject.

II

The first undoubted fact is that in the O.T. the Kingdom of God is always thought of as on this earth. The ex-

pression itself is indeed seldom used, but the thought of God as King and of a time coming when His Kingship would be manifested in righteousness, peace and prosperity is very frequent. It is probable that Jesus would have used the words "the Kingdom of God" if He had meant something quite other than what the readers of the O.T. had in mind? It has indeed been contended that He *substituted* Life Everlasting in Heaven for a Kingdom to be realised on this earth. The former was scarcely thought of in O.T. times, and He undoubtedly confirmed and deepened the expectation of Life Beyond, already well established amongst His people in His own day, so that henceforth Eternal Life Beyond is the certain hope of all His followers. But are we correct in assuming that this meant substitution? For He made another great correction of the hope of the Kingdom. It was not only for the Jews, but for all mankind. And we can see clearly now that the old Jewish hope that a state of righteousness, peace and prosperity could be established in Israel alone, while the rest of mankind lay outside the mercy of God, was a fantastic impossibility. The Creator of All must care for all. But is not the idea of the permanent unsalvability of the world equally impossible? For if this earth is not redeemed, that is, released from sin into the freedom of the service of God, there remains a blot on God's creation—a region in His Kingdom where His writ does not run. It is, I know, replied that His writ does run in destruction of evil doers, for the unredeemed will be destroyed. That, it is said, is part of the Divine victory. It sounds more like failure. It suggests that God, unable to save the world, because its sin is too strong for Him, falls back on the second

best, destroys it and its inhabitants, removing the comparatively few who are saved to Heaven. Is it not altogether more reasonable to assume that just as the hope of immortality was added to the Jewish hope, so also another hope was added that not merely one land, but the whole earth, was to become in fact the Kingdom of God?

If this earth is not to become the Kingdom of God, what is it that prevents it? The answer is of course human sin. But according to the N.T., Jesus Christ came to take away sin. Are these words not really meant? The Anselmic tradition with regard to the Atonement has consistently minimized their meaning by teaching that what Jesus did in dying on the cross was to cancel *the punishment* of sin for the elect. That is not taking away sin. Sin is only taken away as men are reconciled to God, becoming His loyal subjects. And the sin of the world can only be completely taken away when the whole of mankind is loyal to God.

Again we are met with an objection. God has made man free to choose; can there be any certainty that some will not permanently oppose Him? If this is so, then the Kingdom cannot completely come in this world. It must be admitted that the freedom of man is such that he can stand out successfully against almost unbelievable coercion. And we thank God for such greatness of the human spirit. But God does not use coercion on men. His is the appeal of reason and love, which makes no attempt to override or destroy the will-power, but only to exhibit truth and reality to it, so that man may be enlisted on the side of God because he begins to see that opposition to God is also opposition to his own real self, and that

the only way of life is the divine way exhibited in Jesus Christ. The comparative failure of Christianity after nineteen hundred years of Christian preaching and practice no doubt lends countenance to the contention that all men cannot be won. But we are constantly being told that it is the un-Christlike lives of many professing Christians which accounts for the small appeal of the Christian message. I am confident that a not less important cause of the rejection of Christianity is that throughout its history many doctrines have been almost universally preached which by their very nature have gone a long way to counteract its central message of the love of God. I do not refer to those doctrines to which objection is taken on the ground of reason or of scientific knowledge. I mean only those whose moral implications are revolting, such as the doctrine of total depravity, the doctrine of eternal torment, and the doctrine of penal atonement. Against these the sane, God-given instinct of the natural decent man revolts. We cannot possibly say that the Gospel of Christ cannot win all men until we have had a considerable period during which it has been preached without these doctrines, and emphatically denying them, but at the same time displaying Christ as the wisdom and power of God, revealing to men in life, words, and death the all-conquering love of God.

Another objection to the hope of the Kingdom of God in this world is summed up in the statement that it is "Perfectionist." I dislike this word almost as much as do those who make this objection, for it suggests that either here or beyond a human being may reach a point at which he has nothing to learn and no deeper experience of

God and no fuller cooperation with his fellow men to gain; and I feel sure that this is impossible in this life—as impossible as it is undesirable. For a life that does not progress in these three senses stagnates into mere existence. Nor can I conceive that it can be true of Heaven. Such a state might be the Buddhist Nirvana, not Eternal Life.

I maintain then that the words "Kingdom of God" do not imply a static perfection, but certainly do mean loyalty to God expressing itself in a settled will to follow His guidance. This means a great deal more than keeping the moral law, though it includes it. That is exterior and general, this is individual and particular, for each individual is made for communion with God, and while capable of both giving and receiving help from other men, is finally dependent on God working in him both to will and to do of His good pleasure. It is this fundamentally religious basis which constitutes the Kingdom of God.

Understanding the Kingdom of God as I have endeavored to set it forth, certain other objections that have been raised against the belief that it can come on earth simply fall away. That the whole family of God would not be fully united on earth (as the vast majority would be in heaven) is a valid objection to the idea of the final consummation being on earth. It has no relevance against the Kingdom thought of as a world loyal to God, awaiting a greater and endless life beyond. Nor has the prevalence of disease, disaster, and death any relevance. They need not interfere with man's loyalty to God.

One further objection must be considered. It is often contended that those who believe that the Kingdom can come in this world overlook the fact that

children are continually being born into the world, each of whom must for himself enter into the life of loyalty to God, which is the Kingdom, each of whom therefore by not entering into that life may make it incomplete. This is a really serious objection, not, like most of the others, founded upon a misunderstanding; but is it really valid? It is true that many children born into Christian families fail to become genuine Christians. But is not this generally caused by the un-Christian nature of the rest of their environment? We have never yet had the opportunity to discover how children brought up in a wholly Christian environment would develop. A Head-Mistress of wide experience of children of all ages once told me that she had come to the conclusion that all children wanted to be good, and were put off by grown-up people. Does this contradict the doctrine of Original Sin? If it does, it is as well to remember that Jesus said things about children difficult to reconcile with that doctrine. There is no doubt that we all have inborn tendencies which if wrongly developed will produce sin. As Mr. C. S. Lewis pertinently remarks, the fact that one is a self implies possibilities of pride and selfishness. But that these always develop may be due to environment. Are we to assume that the Light Within and the environment of people persistently living in the power of God would not be strong enough to make such an atmosphere of grace as would produce in children almost unconsciously a life of reliance on Divine power? Sin is in its essence simply not trusting God. Would not the sort of atmosphere suggested make trust in God natural to children born into it?

All these objections have one common

factor: They seem unduly to magnify the power of evil and to minimize the power of God. They seem therefore inconsistent with the joyful spirit of victory which prevades the New Testament. And that note of joy and victory is there, even though it is on the basis of New Testament passages that the denial that the Kingdom of God can come in this world is made. To the New Testament, therefore, we must now turn.

III

Undoubtedly many passages in the N.T., taken as they stand, teach what is incompatible with the total conversion of this world into the Kingdom of God. These are mainly the eschatological passages which speak of the Heavenly rapture of the saints, the destruction of the wicked, and the material world consumed by fire at the *parousia* of Christ. The first two are explicitly taught by the Apostle Paul in the two Thessalonian Epistles. The last appears in II Peter. Nowhere else in the N.T. are any of these quite so undeniably taught, but much similar expectation is found here and there elsewhere, notably in the Synoptic Gospels and in the Book of Revelation. But in both these there is also much that points in the opposite direction, as will shortly be pointed out. Nevertheless it is probable that most readers of the Bible who hold this completely other-worldly hope believe that it is firmly based upon the teaching of Jesus. I believe that this assumption is chiefly due to the fact that the "coming of the Son of Man on the clouds of heaven" is almost always understood to mean the end of the world, in the sense of the end of life on this planet. And there is much in Matthew's Gospel that lends countenance to that idea. It is to

be noted however that the passages in Matthew which most strongly suggest this—for it is not stated in so many words—do not appear in Mark, which was the source from which Matthew copied,¹ and not a few scholars to-day are coming to the opinion that on this whole question of eschatology even Mark may have somewhat modified the teaching of Jesus under the influence of ideas then popular. In short the evidence in the Synoptic Gospels that points towards the idea that the Kingdom of God cannot come on earth belongs just to those parts of the Gospel tradition which, partly on the basis of internal evidence, are suspect of being untrustworthy.

The Book of Revelation has also generally been taken as giving a clear statement of the destruction of this world and the transfer of the elect to heaven. And much of its imagery undoubtedly lends countenance to such ideas. But that book is full of strange inconsisten-

cies. For the visions of judgment and destruction of the wicked, and of the reception of the righteous into heaven, are followed by the millennial reign of Christ *on earth*, after which Satan is again loosed on earth and then cast into the lake of fire. Apparently after this again a new heaven and a new earth appear, and the Holy City comes down out of heaven to earth, and God and the Lamb reign on earth. But the new earth can scarcely mean an earth replacing one completely destroyed, for the nations and the kings of the earth are still there, and bring their honour and glory into the City. One is therefore compelled to assume that the author means by "a new earth" very much what Paul means by "a new creation," that is, something cleansed and renewed, but really the same. The words do not imply pessimism with regard to the world, but hope of the Kingdom of God to be established upon it.

It may be suggested that this comparatively late N.T. document is witness to two different eschatological hopes: the utterly other-worldly hope of the apocalyptists, pessimistic about this earth, and another which took seriously the hope that even this earth would some time become a loyal province of the divine Kingdom. The author desiring to be comprehensive tried to combine the two. But both cannot be true. And we, who are logically bound to accept one or the other, cannot fairly quote him as excluding either.

IV

We now turn to those N.T. passages which imply that the Kingdom of God can and must come on earth. The most outstanding of these are in the Gospel and First Epistle of John. In these

¹ Compare Matt. 24:3, where "thy coming and the end of the world" are spoken of as identical, with the early verses of Mark 13 in which neither phrase appears. Again, the words are not the words of Jesus. They are a question put by Matthew into the mouths of His disciples. Moreover the words translated "the end of the world" do not mean the end of this earth or the end of human life upon it but the end of the age. Similarly in Matt. 16: 27, 28, a statement is put into our Lord's mouth that the Son of Man will come as judge within the lifetime of some of those present. The original in Mark, which Matthew has considerably altered, is both far less explicit about judgment and does *not* state that any one present will live to see the Son of Man coming, but that they will see the Kingdom of God come with power, a phrase capable of a much wider interpretation. Other instances of Matthew's alteration of his sources in the same direction can be seen in Streeter's *Four Gospels* and in *The Lord of Thought* by Dougall and Emmet.

writings the words "Kingdom of God" seldom occur. It is generally recognised that the Johannine equivalent of that phrase is "Eternal Life" or simply "Life." In none of the places in which these words occur is it clear that "John" thinks of the whole world as potentially the Kingdom of God, but they are used in ways that do imply that to "John" the distinction between this world and the world beyond was to some extent obliterated, for they assert that Eternal Life begins here and now. The relevant passages are John 3: 13, "He that believeth on the Son hath [present tense] Life"; John 11: 26, "He that liveth and believeth on me shall never die"; and I John 5: 12, "He that believeth on the Son hath Life." It is in some of his references to "the world" that it becomes clear that he believed that the Kingdom of God must come on earth. I find three of these in the Gospel and two in the Epistle. They are as follows:

John 1: 29, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of *the world*."

John 3: 16, 17, "God so loved *the world*, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world, but that *the world* through him might be saved."

John 17: 21, "That they all may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that *the world may believe that thou didst send me*."

I John 2: 2, "He (Jesus Christ) is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but *also for the whole world*."

I John 4: 14, "We have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be *the Saviour of the world*."

In one form or another all these passages suggest that the whole world is the object of God's love, that the work of Christ is for the whole world, and

that the issue of that work is to be that the opposition to God, which is the essence of man's sin, is to be removed, that is, that not merely some individuals, but finally the whole of mankind, the world, will be loyal to God. This is confirmed by the places where "John" speaks of overcoming the world, as for example I John 5: 4, "This is the victory that hath overcome the world, even our faith," and John 16: 33, "In the world ye have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." The natural and obvious meaning of such words is that Christ is absolutely certain of final victory in this world, so certain that the statement of it can be put in the past tense, and that the actual completion of that victory depends upon the faith of His followers, that is, on their loyalty to God. Similarly in the passages quoted before, while most of them attribute the saving of the world directly to Christ, one of them states that the world will believe, and so attain to salvation when it sees in the disciples of Christ a unity based upon, and similar to, His unity with the Father. This passage is so often quoted as if it meant that a formal unity of organization, of ministry and methods of divine worship were expected to produce conviction. Surely these are entirely secondary things. The unity required is unity in loyalty to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the committal of life to Him, acceptance of His guidance, and obedience in the power of His Spirit. There is scarcely a word about the former in the N.T., but it is full of the latter.

On the simple, and at first sight obvious, meaning of the passages quoted, then, "John" believed that it was the Divine purpose to bring the whole world

back to God: that this was the work of Christ, and that by Him it was committed to His followers, whose unity in loyalty to God would bring it to completion. But we are faced with the fact that all such passages have had their meaning greatly minimised by the Church generally. This can be seen clearly from the interpretation of the first as given in the authoritative Grimm-Thayer's *N.T. Greek Lexicon*: ἀίρω "to take away" means *here* to remove the guilt and punishment of sin by expiation, or to cause the sin to be neither imputed nor punished! This is both a perversion and a minimising of the clear meaning of the passage. It comes from the long-continued domination of theological thought by Anselm's Doctrine of Atonement, which is wholly concentrated, not on sin itself—man's disloyalty to God—but on the assumed necessity that God must punish, and cannot forgive freely apart from a satisfaction. If we put aside as untrue this Anselmic perversion, as at last many Christian thinkers are putting it aside, all these passages assure us that "John" was confident that the whole world would in time become a loyal province of the Kingdom of God, and that he either had a record of words of Jesus to that effect, or was so sure from his life-long communion with the risen Master, that this was the purpose of His coming that he did not hesitate to put the words into His mouth. In brief, the teaching of "John" is that the Kingdom must come in this world.

The more mature teaching of Paul is on the same lines. We have seen that in his early epistles to the Thessalonians his expectation is a rapture of the saints to Heaven and the destruction of the wicked at the parousia of Christ, an

expectation which excludes the Kingdom established on this earth. But during the interval between the writing of those epistles and that to Romans, his eschatological expectation was utterly changed. In the middle verses of Rom. 8, he speaks of the creation eagerly waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God, when the creation itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God (verses 20, 21). Two other somewhat later epistles confirm this. In Phil. 2: 10, he expresses the conviction that "In the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth [i.e. angels, man, and demons]; and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father." Is not this passage a distinct statement that the final fruit of the work of Christ will be the winning of all spiritual beings everywhere to allegiance through Him to God? Note that he pictures them all making the confession that constitutes a Christian, "Jesus is Lord."

The same thing is said in slightly different words in Col. 1: 20, where it is stated that God will through Christ "reconcile all things to himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross; through him, I say whether things upon earth or things in the heavens." These three passages do not explicitly foresee the Kingdom of God established on this earth, though the word creation in the Romans passage suggests it, but they do show a radical alteration in the Apostle's conception of eschatology. In his mature thought, Paul had become a universalist. He believed in a final constructive triumph of God through the work of Christ, a completely satisfying triumph, because it would be the redemp-

tion of all spiritual beings, their complete reconciliation to God, who would henceforth reign over a Kingdom without rebels. This would logically include the Kingdom on this earth, and as already said the use of the word "creation" in Rom. 8 suggests that he consciously included it. Of course it will be urged against this that in I Cor. 15 Paul says explicitly that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God," and that that statement is a denial of the Kingdom of God on earth. But what the words mean is simply that we are not to expect to carry our bodies of flesh and blood up to Heaven. It would be unwise to read more into the words than their original meaning. But even so, seeing that it is pretty certain that Paul's views changed on the subject of the resurrection, between the time when he wrote I. Cor. and the writing of the early chapters of II Cor., so as his thought was developing into universalism, the clearly logical step of the assertion of the necessary establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth may have been finally taken in the interval of some months between the writing of I Cor. and Romans. And in II. Cor. 5: 19 we read the great statement of the Gospel, "God was in Christ reconciling *the world* unto himself" a sentence which if it does not mean that the Kingdom of God is to come on earth is very badly expressed.

Paul then like "John" teaches that the Kingdom of God is to come on this earth. His statements on the subject are neither so numerous, nor so explicit as "John's." But if we had not the very explicit statement of a view incompatible with it in the early epistles, no one would ever have doubted, after reading Romans, Philippians, Colossians, and

II Corinthians, that he intended to teach it. There is only one question to be answered, and that is, is Paul's earlier or later thought the truer? I personally believe that we must choose the later, because it is the more honouring to God. For can anyone to-day really believe that it more fully shows the divine power to destroy sinners and the world they live in than to save all, by transforming them into saints? I believe that those who accept the other view now-a-days do so sadly and only because they are assured it is the teaching of Scripture. But as I have showed, Scripture teaches both. And Paul is the test case, for in the early days of his missionary work he certainly accepted destruction, not universalism, and in his most mature writings universalism has replaced it, and almost certainly along with it he began to hope for the Kingdom of God on earth.

Turning again to the Synoptic Gospels, and putting on one side the eschatological passages as under suspicion of misrepresenting what Jesus actually said, we find nothing that points against the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth, and much that suggests it. Trust in God, which is its essence, is spoken of as if it were the obvious basis of life for men, which Jesus is surprised to find lacking. He points out that other living things naturally obey the law of God, and asks why man does not? The Parables of Growth suggest that Jesus saw in the natural and usual processes of nature God at work in a way parallel to His way with men in the establishment of His Kingdom. For this is God's world and nature reveals Him. Men in the past had supposed that they saw God chiefly in the violent, unusual, and destructive forces of nature. Jesus sees Him in the usual

and beneficent—the Creator still at work in living things. As life develops gradually, so the true life of man, the life under God's guidance, takes time to mature. It does not come with a thunder-clap. The interest of Jesus in the ordinary things of life suggests that to Him the one defect in the world was man's lack of faith. And that lack could be remedied. All this and much more that could be mentioned points towards the Kingdom established in this world, and established not by some sudden intervention of God in forceful action from without, but, as in the processes of nature, by His action within in the development of life. All these are antithetical to the eschatology which has come down to us in the N.T. in His name. All suggest an eschatology congruent with the order of nature, which is God's order; and therefore at last God will transform mankind and His world, so that it shall be *de facto*, what it has always been *de jure*, the Kingdom of God.

In view of all this, can we possibly refuse to take the words of the Lord's Prayer at their face value? "Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as in Heaven" must mean that the Kingdom will really come on this earth. The words of Jesus in another connection perhaps have relevance here, "According to your faith be it unto you." The Kingdom has not come on earth because men have not really expected it to come, or, when they have expected it, have thought of it as a destructive in-breaking of incalculable divine power, and not as the inner working of God in those who submit their lives to Him. Has the Church generally ever expected it as both an inner work of God in the individual, and, at the same time and in consequence of that inner working as an

entire transformation of human society? It is along those lines that we should understand the Parables of the Kingdom, and in consequence pray the Lord's Prayer with intelligence and desire.

V

We may then sum up the matter thus: The assumption of the Barthians and others that there is one New Testament doctrine of the Kingdom of God and that it is wholly otherworldly is not according to fact. We, who believe that the Kingdom of God can come in this world, and that it ought to and must sometime include the whole of mankind and the whole earth, transforming human life in both individual and society into what God meant it to be, one community wholly loyal to Him—we have just as much justification for our conviction, even on a somewhat superficial reading of the N.T., as have they. And when we come to weigh the evidence on both sides, as I have attempted—rather inadequately—to do, the evidence for their side crumbles away, and that for ours stands firmer than before. For, as we have seen most of the general arguments against the Kingdom on this earth contain some misunderstanding of the subject. The very foundation of the view that it is wholly otherworldly is found in the eschatological teaching which in early days crept into the Church and demonstrably altered the reports of some of the sayings of Jesus. This appears in Paul's earliest epistles, and is replaced by something quite different in those which express his mature thought. It does not appear in "John," who denies some of its most prominent features. And both "John" and Paul have teaching which clearly implies that in their view the Kingdom must come

in this world. The same is the natural inference from most of the words of Jesus recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, and, strange as it may seem, the Kingdom in this world actually finds support in the Book of Revelation.

One word more. It would not be fair to the Barthians not to mention what is probably the basis of their denial that the Kingdom must come in this world. Their movement is a reaction, and a reaction in part at least justified, against a phase of Theological Liberalism which tended to degenerate into mere Humanism, which so equated the coming of the Kingdom of God with better social conditions, that it was at least sometimes supposed to be something that man could achieve on his own resources, a service done for God, and scarcely in any sense an act of God. They therefore swung to the other extreme and delighted in saying, "God will bring it in His own good time; man can do nothing." This paper has been written in the belief that both these extremes are mistaken. The Kingdom is not a new social order. That may be, and no doubt will be, one of its results. The Kingdom is mankind loyal to God. It begins within the individual as he com-

mits his whole being to God that God may work through him. His work is then both God's and his own, as Paul said. But the initiative is God's work in Christ, which brings men to the change of mind needed to let God work through them, and is continued in the guidance and power of the Holy Spirit. Man's part is surrender to God and the obedience which follows. I venture to think that neither Humanistic Liberalism nor Barthianism would ever have disturbed us if the Church generally and all teachers of religion had made it clear that the essence of Christianity is not "going to Church, believing the Creeds, and trying to live a good life," however desirable all these are, but accepting God's gift of Himself in Christ by giving ourselves to God, so that He may inspire, guide, and empower us to do His will.

The Kingdom is to come on earth. We seem farther away from it than ever after the two world wars. Most things look more like the Kingdom of Hell. All the world and most of the Church need to be converted to this essential Christianity. That, I take it, is the first step toward the Kingdom of God on earth.

AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM IN DOCTRINE

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"There is only one thing greater than Liberty, and that is Authority."

In this new day of scientific *miracula* one issue has become increasingly dominant, more and more insistent, until it has reached a psychological climax in the discovery of the possibility of nuclear fission, and that is the age-long problem of authority. For man may have perhaps almost within his grasp the power to utter what would be the last word in liberty, the freedom to destroy his world. The old and "intrepid illusion" of abstract and indeterminate freedom inherited from the Renaissance is dissolving before the stern necessity for concrete and controlled liberties.

But the mighty atom, spectacular though it is, is only one of the many factors and forces hard at work in recent history, rehabilitating and entrenching the principle of authority. The Great War, which was widely broadcast as a kind of decisive conflict between the freedom-loving and forward-looking peoples of the world, and atavistic authoritarianism, has resolved itself into what promises to be a long-drawn-out struggle between two philosophies and systems of authority, each offering its own special brand of liberty. The zealot for the corporate state, Fascist or Communist, claims, sometimes hysterically, that the totalitarian society secures for him the freedom that he desires most, freedom from disunity, from the interminable party strife of parliamentarism, from the raw individualism

of competitive capitalism, and from the atomistic disintegration of a dying world; in short a freedom from fear, above all the fear of want, which he would not barter for all the other freedoms. The advocate of democracy, on the other hand, can only counter by asserting that the democratic process and the democratic way of living insures for him a larger range of freedom and a higher quality of liberty than this. But the whole argument of course involves a scale of values and an heirarchy of liberties, a paramount value and a sovereign freedom which of necessity becomes authoritative.

Positive religions, being of the prophetic type, have always been religions of authority. The distinction between *religions of authority* and *religions of the spirit* is likely to be a fallacious one, partly because it assumes without warrant that the principle of authority is unspiritual, but mostly because the opposition is not one of principle, but concerns solely the source of authority; whether the Spirit of God, speaking through His Word, His Son, at a historic point and in a historic person, Jesus Christ, or the spirit of man, with his myth-making capacity, which tempts him to make God in his own image and to his own glory, is the determinative factor. Both historical Catholicism and historical Protestantism are pre-eminently religions of authority. St.

Thomas and Luther agree in holding Liberty to be the daughter of Grace, and that true freedom is to be found only in obedience to Him who is the Truth. Calvin trumped every dictum of the Church, *Ecclesia locuta est*, with the prophetic cry, *Thus saith the Lord*.

The ground of authority in religion is precisely the same as in every other sphere of life. Authority is rooted in necessity. Its authentic note is *givenness*. Authority has its seat in that which is given to man, that which he did not create, and which he cannot change. Thus authority for the plain man is the coerciveness of brute fact. Like Margaret Fuller, he accepts the universe, the psycho-physical character of man, birth, death, and the struggle for existence, as he accepts the weather. He may have his moments of dumb rebellion, but elemental necessities, food, drink, sleep, sex, reign supreme. For the scientist authority resides in certain inevitable beliefs, such as belief in an external world, a world of persons and things, and in the regulative concept of natural law. Indeed the whole scientific method of experiment is balanced on faith in an authoritative uniformity of nature which alone makes repetition possible. The philosopher acknowledges the authority of necessary truths and laws of thought, especially the indispensable law of contradiction, without which the thinker would end in intellectual stultification. The religious man is compelled to affirm the authority and supremacy of the spiritual, since it is the only way in which he can see life *sub specie aeternitatis*. The Christian adores "the one abiding, transcendent and supremely given reality," He who is; and "believes in Jesus Christ as a unique revelation in true personal form of His mystery."

AUTHORITY AND THE GOSPEL

For classical Catholicism and classical Protestantism alike, the sole source of authority is Jesus Christ. He is the Word of God and He alone is final and infallible, book and vicar at most having only a derived or delegated "infallibility." He is the Gospel in Person and in deed. This infallibility is to be found not in words about Him, or even in His own words as reported by His disciples, since we can never be completely certain of the *verba ipsissima* of Scripture: the finality is in His Person and His redeeming work. God in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, is the Gospel, and it is pre-scriptural. St. Paul makes clear to the Corinthian Christians that he has delivered unto them only that which he first received. St. Luke's purpose, as he tells us, is "to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely believed among us." The Lukan treatise is written that Theophilus may know the certainty of those things, wherein he has already been instructed. What weighed with the first believers, as we see clearly enough from the synoptic story and the Acts of the Apostles, was not His teachings, though He spake with authority, but "first and foremost, the direct and immediate impression made by His whole personality, of the presence in Him of something 'numinous,' not to be understood in terms of the categories of ordinary human life, and next, the confirmation of this impression by the transcendent events of the resurrection on the third day and the wonderful manifestations of the day of Pentecost. And it seems that when the message of the Gospel was to be conveyed to a world at large which had known nothing of the Master be-

fore His death, the only facts of His career to which importance was attached were just the facts that He had been crucified 'for our sins,' 'declared to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead,' and was now actively 'sending the Spirit' on believers."¹ Thus all Christian doctrine centers in His Person as the express image of the Invisible God and revolves around His work as the *Salvator Mundi*. God in Christ, personally engaged in the work of man's salvation, is the Gospel within the gospels, and before the gospels.

AUTHORITY AND THE CHURCH

But Christ does not stand alone. He is no solitary figure: He is seen in the midst of His disciples: He makes Himself known to the community of believers. The Word does not manifest Himself or unveil His glory to the world, but to the disciples on the third day, and to the company of faithful men at Pentecost. By His own act, and His own will the Church, the *communis fidelium*, is made the pillar and ground of truth in this world.

Undoubtedly men apart from the Church Institutional have derived inspiration and perhaps some measure of comfort from reading the Church's story of His earthly life, yet nonetheless it is true that no man has ever been able to come even to "Jesus" save through His Church. For there are not two Christs, the so-called "Jesus of History" and the "Christ of Faith," there is only one Christ, the one and undivided Christ of religious history, who is the Lord and Head of the Church. Indeed we know now that the bland historical Jesus of

the Nineteenth Century was the pure fiction of liberal theologians who in the name of historical reconstruction were often completely disdainful of this historic fact: the Christ of the Church is the only real Christ, since He is the only Christ of which we have any record, and He is the awesome protagonist of the total New Testament, who holds the keys of Death and Hell. If this Christ be spurious, then without compromise the Church must go down and carry with her all history about Him.

In consequence the Church possesses a unique authority in doctrine, that is in teaching the Gospel, second only to Christ, for she too is given, not made by man, created to be the medium for the communication of the Gospel to the world. As Mary, through the Holy Spirit, was the bearer of the fleshly body of the Incarnate Lord's humanity, so His Body the Church, through the same Spirit, is the earthly bearer of the Eternal Word. But her authority is that of a bearer, not an originator, for she is created and not begotten. She is divinely commissioned to preach Christ, to proclaim the Gospel, but she has no authority to add to it, or subtract from it. As the appointed teacher to the nations she has the authority to translate the Gospel into language that may be understood of men, but she has no authority so to translate it as to abolish it by altering its meaning. If she does, she unchurches herself. Her authority is that of a trustee: it is the authority of responsibility. Among all created authorities she has the last word in controversies of faith, and she alone has the right to determine, in view of existing conditions, what doctrines may be taught in the name of the community and with the consent of the community,

¹ A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, Series II, p. 129.

as consistent with the integrity of the Gospel. But her authority is limited because created, derived and delegated. It is not absolute. A derived absoluteness is a contradiction in terms. Nor can we speak of an infallible Church, since we can "ascribe infallibility to no created power."² Infallibility is incommunicable. The Church is the pillar and ground of truth, but Christ is the Rock. "Upon myself the Son of the Living God, will I build my Church. I will build thee upon myself, not myself upon thee."³

AUTHORITY AND THE ECUMENICAL SCRIPTURES

As the Church is the creation of Christ, so the New Testament is the creation of the Church. Christianity began not with a book but with a Person and a worshipping community, with the Gospel and the Gospel sacraments, baptism into His death and resurrection and the breaking of bread. The Holy Scriptures therefore have never been formative for faith or for doctrine, since it was the faith of the Church and the apostles' doctrine which originally gave form to the Scriptures. This faith existed first in oral tradition, but oral tradition has its limitations, not only as a medium for the communication of the faith of the Church to new generations, but as a means for the preservation of the Gospel Truth in its integrity. And so shortly the apostles and disciples and believers wrote down, as St. Luke tells us, what their eyes had seen and their hands handled of the Word of Life, or

what they had heard or received from eye-witnesses of His Majesty. Among these writings, gospels and epistles, the Church chose certain ones to compose the Ecumenical Scriptures and put her *imprimatur* on them. These, said the Church, we believe to be the most authoritative records we possess of the apostolic experience of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the Pentecostal experience of the Living Lord. Thus the Church by canon certified the Scriptures, and there is no other historical certification.

The Church as the trustee of the Gospel and the authenticator of the New Testament, is the keeper and interpreter of Holy Writ; the New Testament is a community book, written by and for the community, and in the fullest sense only to be understood within the Church. The New Testament possesses an authority all its own, an authority which is unrivalled within its own field, for it carries us back to the concrete richness of the life and the words and the deeds of the Son of God, but it is not the Word of God; it is a sacrament of the Word; it is not the revelation, but the record of the revelation. We cannot claim inerrancy for the documents, or ascribe to them infallibility, since the record has come to us through the channels of creatureliness, but we can speak of the *adequacy* of the Scriptures for salvation. The Holy Bible contains not all truth, or truth in its absoluteness, but all things necessary for salvation. Because it is the only written record we possess of the revelation authenticated by the Church, because it has the freshness and the substantiality of apostolicity, it remains forever normative for Christian doctrine. Henceforth no doctrine is to be held *de fide* which cannot be proved

² P. E. More and F. L. Cross, *Anglicanism*, p. xxviii.

³ St. Augustine: *Serm. (de Script. N.T.)* LXXVI. i.l.

by the sanction of the total New Testament, or is repugnant to the mind of Christ, or the spirit of the Gospel revealed therein. But the Bible cannot be formative for the Faith, since the Faith antedated it, and since it was the Faith which inspired the New Testament, not the New Testament which inspired the Faith.

AUTHORITY AND THE ECUMENICAL CREED

Anglican tradition, as expressed for example in the Lambeth Quadrilateral of 1888, has always closely associated the Scriptures and the Creeds as dual authorities. This would seem to be good history and good theology, as it is also good statesmanship and good sense, for Christian Creeds and Christian Scriptures grew up together and belong together. It is useless to ask which is older. The writings which were later to compose the canonical New Testament were in existence long before the Ecumenical Creed of Nicaea, but there were creeds in the form of baptismal confessions of faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God from the earliest days of the Church.⁴ The New Testament was written primarily to be a record of the Lord's work, above all His mediatorial death and redeeming resurrection; the creeds proclaimed the Gospel of His Person. And it is worth noting that the authentication of both the Ecumenical Scriptures and the Ecumenical Creed belong to the same century. No Ecumenical Council has pronounced on the canon of the New Testament, but scholars generally agree that the canon may be said to have reached its final form in the Fourth Century, in the West, by the decree of the Council of Carthage in

397. Thus throughout their history from beginning to end, they have been complementary and are mutually interpretative. The Ecumenical Creed of Nicaea in 325 may not be interpreted in any way at variance with the Ecumenical New Testament, nor may the Scriptures of the Church be expounded so as to contradict the Gospel of the Person of Christ enunciated in the Church's Creed. Both have the same sort of historical authentication, and both bear their witness to the Faith of the Church.

The Nicene Creed was put forth as the answer of the Church to what from the beginning proved to be the determinative question for faith. What think ye of Christ? whose son is He? How explain the Gospel of His Person to the Hellenic mind, permeated with Neo-Platonism (which was Platonism with Plato mostly left out and weakened by the mysteries)? Was he Jesus, the son of Mary and Joseph, the gentle carpenter of Nazareth, and the poetic preacher of moral perfection, whose uniqueness might be explained by the genial theory of apotheosis, not unpleasant to pride of race, or uncongenial to minds long accustomed to the idea of demi-gods and deified men? Or was He the True and Living God, whom the Church worshipped without committing idolatry or uttering blasphemy? And if He were Very God of Very God, what became then of the uncompromising monotheism of the Church, and what was His relationship to the Absolute, to the universe, to history, and to man? Were there then two Gods, the Absolute and the Incarnate; God the Infinite and Eternal, incomprehensible and ineffable, enthroned untouchably, the Great Unknowable of Neo-Platonism, and the God

⁴ Acts 8: 37.

men's eyes had seen and hands handled, branded finite by the stigmata of Calvary, the *grande créature* of Arianism? The answer of the Church was "God of God, Light of Light, True God of True God; Begotten, not made; Being of one substance with the Father; by Whom all things were made: Who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven, And was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, And was made man." This is the Church's authoritative statement of the dogma of the Incarnation, the great divide which separates Christianity forever not only from all other religions, but from all other theisms, the authoritative dogma which contains the Christian doctrines of God and Man and their relationship. This proclamation of the indissoluble union of God and His world, God and man, though His creative and redeeming Word, is the Gospel behind the gospels. This one fact of the Incarnation, as Paul Elmer More has said, is the rock which we see rising in sublime isolation from the midst of a sea of seething waves and the tides of controversy which in the early days surged around the Faith.⁵

And it must be admitted that there is much to be said for the same writer's contention "that no more vital task confronts the Church today than to recognize the urgent necessity of insisting on the unreserved acceptance of the one dogma of the Incarnation as the definite, clear, and common mark of a Christian, while leaving to the conscience of each individual how far he will interpret the accessory articles of faith as literal or symbolical, as fact or poetry." To do

so is simply "to distinguish between what is essential, permanent, and immutable, and that which must change with the changing modes of thought."⁶ It is at least definitely arguable whether profession of faith in the Person of the Incarnate Lord is not sufficient for the baptismal confession of faith rather than "belief in all the Articles of the Christian Faith as contained in the Apostles' Creed," especially since Christ is the object of faith, not the Articles of the Creed, and when we forget this all doctrine becomes distorted. Also the Ecumenical Creed of Nicaea was never intended to be a baptismal confession of faith, but a test of right faith for the bishops as teachers of the Faith.

Yet nonetheless certain reservations must be made. For what is fact and what is symbol in the Creed? The Incarnation is both fact and symbol, as is the Resurrection, and for that matter the Virgin Birth. The Ecumenical Creed is the Gospel put into language, and all language is symbolic. Indeed fact and symbol are so inextricably intermingled, not only in *homoousios* and *monogenês* but also in the deceptively simple statement "*crucified for us* under Pontius Pilate," that they can never again be completely disentangled.

Then too, it would seem to be an unpardonable lapse into reductionism to limit in any wise the authoritative faith of the Church to the dimensions of the embryonic intellect and rudimentary reason of the beginner in the faith. It is legitimate to hope, and normally even to expect, that the child of God will grow in grace and knowledge, and by incorporation into His Body, the Church, will attain to a mature faith

⁵ Paul Elmer More, *Christ the Word* (The Greek Tradition), p. 131.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.

and be able to comprehend with all the saints the wholeness and the fullness of the Ecumenical Faith. As St. Thomas Aquinas says, "The confession of faith is made in the creed as in the person of the whole Church which is united by faith. But the faith of the Church is an instructed faith (*fides formata*) . . . and therefore the confession of faith is made in the creed in terms suitable to an instructed faith, so that even if there are individuals among the faithful who have not an instructed faith, they should desire to reach it."⁷ The authority of the Creed, like that of the Church and the Scriptures, should be interpreted as an augmentative, expanding, creative authority. When we are baptized we are baptized not into our own faith, but into the Faith of the Church. We are probably not capable as individuals of giving full intellectual assent to every article of the Faith; but we accept the creed as a whole, *ex animo*, by an act of conscience and will. "This we acknowledge to be the Catholic faith, to which through all failures of faith we intend to unite ourselves."⁸

AUTHORITY AND THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS

Although we cannot fully share in the veneration for the Ecumenical Councils possessed by Gregory the Great, who is reported to have honored the Four Councils as the Four Gospels, it would not be easy to exaggerate their importance for the ancient Church and the perennial vitality of their pronouncements in the light of nineteen centuries of Christian history and Christian thought. Had an Ecumenical Council

been possible in the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Century, and had not the political maneuverings of both Patriarch and Pope and the plotting of the nations nullified every attempt to convene such a council, Christendom might have been saved from some of the more disastrous consequences that were to follow from the head-on collision of a decadent mediaevalism and a justly, if not wisely, infuriated Luther. And if the Church is to decide in controversies of faith and doctrine concerning the Gospel which is the soul and life of the Church, there would seem to be no more legitimate spokesman for the Church than an Ecumenical Council. In a divided Church where every pronouncement is sectional and sectarian, the *auctoritas* of the Church and of every communion suffers not only before the world, but over its own faithful.

The most important of the Ecumenical Councils as regards doctrine were the First and the Fourth, the Council of Nicaea in 325, which saved the unity of God, and the Council of Chalcedon in 451, which safeguarded the unity and integrity of the Person of Christ. It has become the fashion in many quarters to criticize the Symbol of Chalcedon by asserting that not only its terminology in general, but its categories of substance and nature in particular, are not in harmony with modern thought forms. But this is to miss the point at issue in the Fifth Century and the purpose of the work of Chalcedon. The Chalcedonian fathers were not writing a treatise in metaphysics, and still less in psychology; they were defending and restating the dogma of the Incarnation against those who, in attempting to psychologize the Person and psycho-analyze the mind of the Incarnate Lord, had

⁷ *Summa Theol.*, 2a 2ae, 9, 1, art. 9.

⁸ Charles Gore, *The Holy Spirit*, p. 287.

abolished the fact of His incarnation. And as long as there are such realities as being, and forms of being with their own distinctive qualities, it is difficult to see how the categories of substance and nature can ever be outmoded. It is strange too that liberal theologians, who jealously watch over the humanness of Jesus, should cavil at Chalcedon, which preserved for them His true human nature. For the deity of Christ was not at stake in the Fifth Century, it being universally acclaimed after the wave of Arianism had receded. It was the Lord's humanity that the Hellenic mind was determined to reduce to innocuousness. When we remember that the bishops at Chalcedon were not arm-chair philosophers, handling ideas, but teachers of the Faith, dealing with actual conditions and intellectual forces, we may well marvel at their admirable restraint and their theological statesmanship, especially their refusal to dazzle the ingenuous with another heresy of over-simplification. One is at least permitted to shudder at the thought of a statement concerning the unity of the Person of Christ in terms of a popular process philosophy, or in harmony with the thought forms of psycho-analysis.

And yet the Ecumenical Council is neither the source of authority, nor is it a seat of authority. What *auctoritas* it possesses is due to the fact that it represents the mind of the Church, and its decisions must be submitted to the conscience and judgment of the community.

FREEDOM UNDER AUTHORITY

Most reasonable men would probably acknowledge the necessity for increased authority in our time, wherever man

lives in society, even in the sphere of international affairs, where it has been largely outlawed since the break-up of catholic Christendom and the rise of the nations. It is freedom which is on trial today. All the titanic forces of the century, nationalism, war, naturalism and scientism, and the new giantism of machinery, have converged and conspired to put liberty in jeopardy. And the Christian Church may yet prove to be the last stronghold for freedom of conscience on the continents of Europe and Asia. It is of the utmost importance therefore, however the state goes, that the Church, as trustee of the Gospel, the truth that makes men free, shall not allow herself to be sucked again into any new orbit of absolutism. Although on the side of law and order, since order is Heaven's first law, she cannot permit herself, in the interests of her authority, to become a wheel-horse for "good" government, or an advocate for any system of temporal order, lest she lose her freedom to proclaim the Gospel and her power to save society. The Christian Gospel is a gospel of authority, but it is also the Gospel of the Liberator. The exercise of authority is always the more spiritual where it is the more freely accepted. Conscience for the Christian Church is incoercible, and even the erring conscience obligates. Men must be allowed the same freedom to deny and reject the Gospel as they had to reject and crucify the Lord. Proof of the Gospel is at bottom no more than persuasion, and when the Church is tempted to depart from the pathway of persuasion she becomes untrue to the mind of Christ and to the witness of the Apostolic Church. "Nothing conquers but the truth, and the victory of truth is love."

The Church must be ready to submit, not only her Scriptures, but her doctrines, to criticism. This submission is implicit in the Incarnation. But she has the right to demand that such criticism be honest criticism, based on a consideration of all the facts. It must be recognized on all sides that in the nature of the case the Gospel fact is not open to the same kind of empirical verification as the facts of nature. It is not unfair to ask that the Gospel be judged in the light of what it claims to be, a revelation, by its meaningfulness and fruitfulness, not by what the critic thinks it is, or thinks it ought to be. The Church will in no wise refuse the right of reason to examine and judge her Gospel; the Church is not greater than her Lord. Reason is neither a source or seat of authority, nonetheless it is the only means by which man may accept authority. But reason must not be taken in the bare pittance of its former high estate of meaning to which naturalistic philosophies have degraded it, and made it synonymous with the purely analytic processes of the intellect. Reason is to be understood in the fashion in which all the magnanimous thinkers throughout the ages have understood it, as the activity of the whole personality, using all the grand resources of human nature, conscience and will as well as intellect, in the apprehension and interpretation of reality. Behind the mechanics of thought is man the person, man the lover and the doer as well as the thinker.

The Church will willingly concede as much freedom of belief for the believer within the community as is consistent with her witness before the world. There is a place for a healthy heterodoxy, which is not heresy, within the continuity of the Gospel. It is her right

and duty to admonish through her properly constituted officers, but she will not excommunicate except for apostasy, and apostasy is clearly defined in the New Testament: the Anti-Christ is he who denies that the Son of God is come in the flesh. She will make room for the prophet, and for the liberty of prophesying, lest the repetition of the formula of the Gospel become ecclesiastical and theological patter, but the prophet will remember that he is not his own, that he belongs to the community, that he is under vow to preach, not his own gospel, but the Faith of the Church, and if he is wise and humble like St. Paul, he will always distinguish between what he speaks by commandment and what by the permission of the Church, and he will not abuse the confidence of the community.

EVANGELICAL CATHOLICISM

Many schools of Christian thought would probably agree substantially with most of what, up to this point, has been said about freedom under authority. Granted that there is such a thing as the right of private judgment and that the conviction of the individual conscience is a necessary consequence of the Christian doctrine of man as a person, still no sane man would stand upon this minimal right and hold it to be a test of truth. Nonetheless the chief problem remains. What authority has the Church, as teacher to the world, to translate the Gospel into doctrines suitable for teaching men under the actual conditions of an age, and at a particular stage of their development? And what is the criterion by which we may distinguish between doctrines which may be permissive for teaching purposes, but which may also

be outgrown, and those which are properly a part of the *theologia perennis*? The answer is to be found in a theory of authority which is both catholic and evangelical, where catholicism stands for richness and inclusiveness, for universality and for freedom, and evangelicalism for the integrity and continuity of the Evangel.

If Christianity is the religion of the Incarnation, and if the Church is a continuation of the Incarnation, then, as Augustine held, she is the heir of the ages. All truth belongs to the Christian, not only the treasures of Hebrew law and prophecy and devotion, but Hellenic wisdom as well. Are they not, as Clement of Alexandria said, "fragments torn off from the Eternal and Living Word?" Thus Christianity, as the fulfilling religion, has been collecting doctrines all through the centuries. Not only are Platonism and Aristotelianism still well preserved in classical catholicism, but an already archaic subjective idealism and a defunct evolutionism have corroded the substance of liberal Christianity, while bits of obsolete science have become embedded, like thorns in the flesh, in the body of Protestant fundamentalism. This universality and freedom is the glory of a truly catholic Christianity, but it is also its greatest danger, for it is possible for a religion to become so universal, so all-things-to-all-men, so everything-in-general, that it ends up by being nothing-in-particular. It becomes amorphous, that is without form; it ceases to be itself. Along with the universality of Christianity must go its uniqueness, and uniqueness can only be maintained by centrality, by an hierarchy of doctrinal values, the determination to put central

things in the center and everything else on the periphery. For otherwise we have universality run amuck, catholicism that has gone to seed and become decadent. By the Evangel, the Gospel of the Person of the Lord and His redeeming work, we can alone decide between a doctrine like the doctrine of Purgatory for example, which has great logical force and is eminently reasonable but can only be permissive and peripheral, and the doctrine of the Resurrection, which is central, structural, and by commandment.

The future would then seem to lie with an Evangelical Catholicism, not with a Liberal Catholicism or a Liberal Protestantism. Liberalism has done its work; it has fought a good fight against obscurantism, but it has been adjectival rather than substantive. It will always remain as a critical attitude, but in religion as well as in politics it has not the force to match the hour. In its worship of the spirit of science it has too often mistaken the tentative hypotheses of the scientists for the accents of the Holy Ghost and the trumpets of eternity. It has swallowed scientism over-eagerly, and evolutionism hook, line, and sinker, and it will have to disgorge. In its intellectual torments over the Virgin Birth it has hopelessly confused theology with biology, and in its fastidiousness about a substantial resurrection it has tended to eviscerate the Kingdom of God of all Christian meaning. It has substituted the Greek idea of immortality in general and the indestructibility of spiritual energy for that sovereign realm of truth in which true and concrete persons dwell forever in true personal relationships with God and with each other. In the name of tolerance it would have

fastened upon us a proud new kind of scholasticism, less humble and therefore less tolerable than the old.

Here too is the hope some day for the reunion of the Church around the Gospel of the Person of the Lord, a reunion by conviction, if we can only be patient and sit loosely to mere emotional appeals for fraternity and dictatorial mergers, perhaps desperately designed to save the face of the Institutional Church at the expense of the authority of the Gospel.

Note: The writer of this article has had to forego reluctantly any discussion of the philosophy and theology of freedom, as this would involve a treatment of the whole Christian doctrine of Man. For lack of space he has also had to restrict himself to questions of authority and freedom in doctrine which concern the whole body of Christians, and omit consideration of the nature and limits of the authority of provincial councils within the Anglican communion.

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SUFFERING AS THE PROOF OF SIN

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The degenerate condition of modern ethical thinking can hardly be overstated. In many ways it is prejudiced, complacent, unrealistic, arrogant, and shot through with contradictions. We make a virtue of generosity and build an economic system on cut-throat competition. We condemn a man to the electric chair for killing his personal enemy, and condemn a man to prison for refusing to kill those that his government has declared enemies of the nation. We listen approvingly to sermons on turning the other cheek and despise the person who suggests doing it. And we assume in all our acts and judgments that man, unlike everything else in creation, is almost entirely free of any cosmic law.

As a result the world today is in a state of disruption; and the signs of the times point not to a rectification of things, but to ever greater and more destructive disruption. It is high time that people in general, and the rulers of men in particular, grappled honestly and clear-headedly with the basic ethical concepts that guide our actions.

I

Our ethical thinking has been in some measure influenced by the ethics of Greece and Rome. It has been influenced more, perhaps, by the simple and uncompromising ethics of the early Germanic tribes. But the chief source of our ethical thinking is the teaching of the Hebrew and Jewish people as recorded in the Bible. In the main the ethics of our civilization are part of a

continuous development having its roots in the ethics of Israel and Judah.

The great pre-exilic prophets all spoke in one vein: Obey or perish. Two centuries of teaching are summarized in this passage from Deuteronomy: "See, I have set before thee this day life and good and death and evil; in that I command thee this day to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply. . . . But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, . . . I denounce unto you this day, and that ye shall surely perish."

The basic postulate underlying this teaching is that obedience to the laws of God will bring not only spiritual welfare, but physical welfare and material prosperity as well. It was an axiom of pre-exilic Hebrew thought that a man's status in the eyes of God and the rectitude of his behavior could be exactly gauged by the conditions of his life, both inward and outward; and that any form of disaster—ill-health, insanity, poverty, persecution, premature death, even childlessness—was proof that the man had sinned. Even as late as the beginning of the Christian era this belief was widely held. The story of the cure of the man born blind in the Gospel of John opens with the question put to Jesus by his disciples, "Master, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?"

But long before the first century A.D. a great many Jewish thinkers had abandoned this belief. The post-exilic Jews

were convinced that they had in their scriptures, at least by implication, every smallest point of God's law for mankind. Yet there were among them men who scrupulously obeyed each jot and tittle of the law and who nevertheless were afflicted with disease or with one or another sort of calamity. Furthermore, the calamity that befell a man was often quite out of proportion to any sin he might have committed. Leprosy was held to be a mark of signal disfavor with God, and yet the upright king Azariah of Judah had died of leprosy. How could such things be?

In the book of Job, written at least as early as the third century B.C., we find recorded the struggle to answer this question and the beginnings of a new concept of suffering. Job was a good man who was afflicted with almost every conceivable calamity. Why? That his goodness might be tested. The story goes that God allowed Job to be afflicted in order to prove that Job's love of God was genuine and not a hireling's return for the prosperity that God had given him. The test vindicated Job. And so, his love having been tested and found unwavering, God gave Job in the end even greater prosperity than he had had before.

The ethical outlook that underlies this story is wholly different from that of the early prophets. It was inconceivable to the Jews of the post-exilic period that their understanding of the law of God might be faulty or incomplete. The only explanation they could find of seemingly undeserved suffering was that it was a test of man's devotion to God and to God's law. So in Job the criterion of a man's goodness lies now no longer in what happens to him, but in his scrupulous adherence, be the conse-

quences what they may, to an inherited code of rules.

During the second and first centuries B.C., this concept of goodness was buttressed by the concept of personal immortality. The pre-exilic prophets knew no immortality other than that of the family or race. The later thinkers had come to believe that individuals might themselves become immortal. This belief provided them with a way out of the difficulties that were only partially solved in Job, and became at last an integral part of the orthodox teaching. Pharisees of the time of Christ taught that though a man might not receive the reward for his goodness in this life, he was sure to receive it after death. In the story of the seven martyrs in the seventh chapter of the apocryphal book of Second Maccabees, one of the martyrs is represented as saying to his executioner, "The king of the world shall raise us up, who have died for his laws, to everlasting life."

Christianity, at its outset, was a reaction to the later Pharisaic view of goodness. The law-system of Judaism had grown so cumbersome that adherence to it had become for many a virtual impossibility. Original Christianity threw out the whole system and substituted two simple injunctions, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. A more explicit statement of the meaning of the second of these injunctions was made in the golden rule. Herein was the sum total of the original Christian ethic.

The basic assumption of this ethic was that man might know the law of God directly and needed no explicit rules. All that was necessary was humanity and universal goodwill. He who

recognized that there was a power greater than himself, and who saw other humans as brother beings whose welfare was inseparable from his own, would not need to be told in any given situation how to act. His own humility and co-operative goodwill would direct him. And because no two situations in life were alike and no specific laws could be formulated that could cope with all possible situations, the man directed by humility and goodwill alone would act in every situation more rightly than he could if he tried to rely on regulations.

The original Christian ethic made a deep impression and has attracted at least lip-service from millions of people since. But its lack of detailed injunctions makes it hard to put into general practise, and any serious attempt to do so was abandoned very early. Even its proponents found difficulties in their attempt to establish it. Several of Paul's epistles were directed against people who had discarded all ethical laws without attaining the humility and goodwill which would enable them to act ethically without them. In the midst of denying the true value of any law whatsoever, Paul began giving ethical instruction that came close to being a reinstitution of the ethical laws of Judaism. Not many of the ritual laws crept back into Christianity. But by the end of the first century A.D., Christian manuals included all of the ten commandments of Moses and an increasing number of others. So the original Christian ethic became in effect but a brief interruption of the main course of development. And within little more than half a century the authority for human behavior had been shifted from the regenerate human heart, where the founders of Christianity had tried to place it, back (with some

important modifications) to the words of scripture.

Meanwhile the concept of suffering expressed in Job had moved to the very center of the picture. In Job suffering is looked upon as a test of man's love to God, unpleasant and undesirable in itself, but to be undergone if God so wills. Among Christians of the early second century suffering was looked upon as a sign of God's favor. Martyrdom, in the Roman arena or elsewhere, was actually sought after. It was universally believed that martyrs had a special place of glory in heaven. And some sort of suffering, to burn the dross from the soul, was considered almost prerequisite to salvation. Obedience to the law, as modified by Christian teaching, was held to be every man's bounden duty; but the tendency was strong to believe that suffering was the effective agent of man's welfare. If we are inclined to think of the persecuted Christians of the first few centuries with pity, we waste our tears. The persecutions were the glory of the church. In the First Epistle of Peter are words that may be found again and again in one or another form in early Christian literature: "If ye suffer for righteousness' sake, happy are ye."

This is far removed from the teaching of the pre-exilic prophets, which said that suffering was a proof of sin. But the development from one teaching to the other can be followed as an unbroken sequence.

II

The divorce of ethics and suffering, already started in Job, fully accomplished in second century Christianity, has persisted to the present day. The result is that for centuries ethical sys-

tems in the Jewish-Christian tradition have not been subject to testing by experience. Man's behavior and man's experience have been in great measure thought of as having no essential relationship. Ideas of goodness have been subjected to no experimental proof of any sort. Thousands have retained the belief of early Christianity that the laws of behavior that man should follow are to be found in the scriptures of Judaism, together with certain modifications recorded in the Christian scriptures. Others, the so-called liberals, have discarded this belief in part or occasionally in totality, and have substituted for Biblical ethics their own prejudices and preferences. And suffering has been looked upon—depending on the temperament of the people—as a test of piety, even a proof of piety, as an affliction of the devil, a horrid accident, or a source of perverse pleasure; but hardly ever as having any real relation to human behavior.

That such an attitude can be held by intelligent and educated people in this modern world is almost unbelievable. In no other department of human life today do we hold to such a notion. The world is full of men of science whose lives are governed by the belief that the phenomena of the universe are controlled by unvarying law—the motions of the stars, the reactions of chemicals, the stability of buildings, the growth of vegetables, the weather, floods, earthquakes, the transmission of sound and light. And yet in this law-conscious world men can believe that their own actions are by divine dispensation free of the ubiquitous, unbribable, inalterable law that governs everything else.

Such a belief is entirely without foundation in the nature of things. The

more we know, the clearer it becomes that man is warp and woof a part of the universe in which he lives. Only the inherited notion that we already know all that matters about right and wrong, linked with the egotistical assumption that man is radically different from the rest of the universe, has kept us from realizing that the same unvarying law that controls the other phenomena of the world controls also the events of human experience. It is simply not true that there is no essential relation between what men do and what happens to them. On the contrary what happens to them is determined by what they do. Every theft, every murder, every lie, every conflict, every invasion of one nation by another, every revolution, every persecution, every blood-purge, has a cause and has come out of that cause as inevitably and impersonally as water comes from snow and ice in the springtime.

In the past century we have in large measure remade our environment by application of our new-won knowledge of the laws that govern the material universe. In our control of material things we have performed miracles. In our management of our own mutual relationships we have failed dismally. Our increased control of our environment has actually in some measure injured us because our understanding of human interaction is so faulty. But there is no need for it. If we would apply to ourselves and to the principles by which we act the same scientific study that we have applied to our environment, we could perform miracles in the field of human relations also.

We have been so enamored of our preconceptions of right and wrong, of good and evil in human behavior, that

we have not yet come to a clear realization of where our difficulties lie. Faced with suffering, we do as the Pharisees did, and fall back on the notion that our suffering is a test of our ability to stand true to our principles. What logically should prove to us that we are acting wrongly is made into an increased incentive to continue to act wrongly. We attribute a divine sanction to stupidity and are caught in a vicious circle.

Men of science start out on their investigations with an open mind and a clean slate. They do not attempt to dictate to things how they should act. They do not tell the planets how they shall revolve or the plants how they shall grow. They watch and record what happens. They then attempt to discover how and why things happen as they do. Gradually they find basic laws governing those happenings. Then, acting in accordance with those laws they try to make things happen as they want them to; and if their perception of the laws has been correct, things do happen as they want them to. Once man comes to realize that every happening in the human world is in like fashion governed by impersonal law, he will see that this same procedure must be followed in every department of life, if he is to live successfully and achieve his desires.

The first step in this direction is a thorough and fearless revaluation of all our ethical values. Are the things we call good actually good? Are the things we call evil in any pragmatical sense evil? Honor, honesty, respect for private ownership, marital fidelity, piety, patriotism, purity, bravery, respect for human life, consistency, altruism—are these in actual fact virtues or do they

stand condemned by their results? Right and wrong are not a matter of preference but a matter of stubborn mathematical fact. An action is right if it achieves the desired result, wrong if it does not; and the result achieved by an action is not determined by the will of the actor, but by the laws that govern human interrelationships. Again, human beings are animals with many powerful and not particularly idealistic appetites. No amount of prurient condemnation will affect this fact: it is a datum. In one fashion or another, directly or indirectly, human appetites will demand and if possible achieve satisfaction. Any workable ethic must so be devised as to allow the satisfaction of human appetites. Any ethic that does not allow it will produce destructive results. The present state of the human world is a manifest condemnation of the principles that are used to govern it. None of them is free of suspicion. None may safely be taken as sound without thorough analysis of its farthest ramifications.

The world is not built in accordance with blueprints of our own preferences and prejudices. It is built in accordance with intrinsic and inviolable laws, which we did not invent, which we have no power to alter or to abrogate, and to which we are totally and inescapably subject. We suffer because we so act within those laws as to cause the suffering. We are not guilty creatures being punished. We are merely ignorant. But the evils that result from our ignorant actions are not the less virulent because we are not guilty in the old-fashioned sense of that word. Our sufferings are still, to use the language of religion, the manifest judgment of God upon our own behavior. And we will continue to

suffer until we have learned why we suffer and have altered our behavior to fit in more constructively with the laws of the universe.

III

The old Hebrew moralists were scientists. They studied human actions and the consequences of human actions, and tried from that to establish rules of human conduct which would result in human welfare. In a very real sense the Mosaic law originated in revelation. Human beings studied cause and effect in human relations till certain underlying principles were revealed to their consciousness. Then on the basis of this revelation they drew up codes for the people to follow. They did not go to a book or consult their own prejudices. They looked at things as they are and used reality itself for their authority.

But they were in some degree pioneers. They had access to comparatively small units of reality. They had no reliable method of investigation. And they formulated what they learned, not in terms of abstract principles, but in specific legislation. As a consequence what they had to say was imperfect in itself, and limited to the conditions of their own time and place. The basic postulate of their work, however, was unimpeachably sound: that human suffering is the proof of sin. We today would word it differently. We should prefer perhaps to say that human suffering is the proof of maladjustment to the cosmic laws that govern human actions and relations. But the essential meaning is the same.

The moralists of post-exilic Judaism took the wrong turning. When confronted with suffering, they questioned and finally abandoned the basic axiom of the older moralists. What they should have questioned was the accuracy of the ethical conclusions of those older moralists. But they had forgotten what the older moralists knew, that the authority for ethical law is in the very nature of things, that what happens in the everyday world is, so to speak, the present judgment of God. So they set up instead the words of their scriptures. They put a book in the place of reality. And so they and their spiritual descendants for well over two thousand years, supposing themselves to be obeying the will of God, have governed their actions by principles of behavior which the day by day happenings in the world were continuously demonstrating as incomplete or wrong.

The time has come, if men want to survive at all, to go back to the basic premise of the pre-exilic moralists and go on from where they left off. There is no need for us to continue wallowing in the slough of our false morality. If we want happiness, food, peace, life, we can have them, once we have taken the time and trouble to find out what causes them. If men can learn how to use the law of gravitation to fly in a metal airplane through the skies, if men can learn how to use the laws of electricity to produce heat and cold and light and to transmit sound and transport great masses from place to place, then men can also learn how to use the laws that govern human relationships to produce happiness, life and peace.

IDEAL HISTORY: REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE WAVE THEORY

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"The echoes are in us of great voices long gone hence."

—Mary Webb, *Gone to Earth*.

It has often been observed that a religious attitude sometimes changes to a skeptical philosophy, that a monarchy is destroyed by the rebellion of the nobility, that a nation full of vigor disintegrates into a rabble of indolent cowards and gives way before the onslaught of young barbarian tribes. These well known facts have given rise to the saying: *History repeats itself*, and have provided the empirical background for one of the oldest theories in the field of history. This theory, called the wave, cycle, or reflux theory was developed by Plato and Polybios, by the medieval Abbot of Flora, the Neapolitan philosopher Vico in the 18th century, by Spengler and Toynbee in our own times.

The essence of this theory consists in the assertion that different civilizations contain far-reaching similarities. Every civilization is born, reaches its climax, and suffers its downfall. Besides that, even single events and characters of one civilization find their true image in happenings and great men of another period. These claims and others are found in the outstanding books on the wave theory, and are based on the assumption that historical objects are comparable. Comparison is the cornerstone of the wave theory. If parallels can be drawn in history, the claims of the wave theory, or at least a considerable part of them, can be justified. The following pages

are devoted to an inquiry into the foundation of this theory.

I. For an unbiased observer there is no doubt that parallels can be drawn in history. In all fields of scholarly investigation analogies are used, and there is no special reason why history should be excluded from this method. Only the philosophers and historians at the beginning of the 20th century, especially in Germany, tried to close the field of history for any analogies, claiming that historical phenomena are unique and individual.

Through their influence the method of comparison has been put on trial—a trial which is not justified at all because there is no interpretation of historical source material possible without drawing parallels. The historian who reads the report of an Assyrian king can understand this document only by transferring some of his own experience and the experience of his own human surroundings to an age which has disappeared long ago. The essential criterion for deciding if any event or fact has happened in the way in which it is reported remains the common sense of the historian. That means that in order to understand historical objects the scholar must include moments of a general category. That does not imply that every bit of an historical object is comparable. In interpretation,

the historian reaches sooner or later the point where analogies do not help, where he faces a new moment which is individual and unique.

The objects of historical research as well as those of any other scholarly investigation carry a twofold appearance: they are individual and comparable at the same time. The objects of historical research can be compared as far as they have any moments in common with each other. The defenders of the wave theory are justified in drawing parallels if their objects have common features. Their objects are the societies or civilizations or periods of history such as the Classical world, the American-European society, the Arabic world, the Mayan civilization—twenty-one different periods, according to Toynbee. Their common features are those facts or forces which are necessary for the existence of these societies. One common element is *human action*, because no change is possible without it. That human action is considered one general element, is considered so self-evident that it does not seem worth mentioning it. Yet human action has two attributes, which are not self-evident, these are *continuity* and *direction*.

There is a time-continuum in human action. Continuity in time means that changes occur slowly, without interruption, and incessantly. Law, fashions, customs, the social structure, language, public opinion, and also the spiritual attitude change from day to day, yet so slowly that we can only realize it by interrupted observations spread over longer periods of time. There is an enormous change from an early Christian basilica to a modern sky-scraper. Yet a break of continuity exists only in appearance. The observer who sees only

the beginning and the end of the development does not visualize the continuity. By looking through any complete book of architecture the observer no longer sees any chasm; the infinitesimal changes become understandable which slowly turn a Byzantine church into a modern business palace.

Continuity is related to direction. Continuity means that changes form an uninterrupted line. Direction means that this line is leading to a goal. The word goal in this connection may have different meanings. A goal may be the climax of a development: e.g. the Gothic architecture attains its culminating point in the cathedral of Chartres and in the fortress church of St. Michel. A goal may be a general problem which is preserved in the course of centuries: e.g. the understanding between labor and management or the collaboration between the states. Another goal closely connected with these is that of cultural and political ideals. Man conceives the idea of a perfect man, state, or society. For the Greeks, the concept of *kalokagathia* was such an idea embracing their whole life; for our times, political liberty seems to play a similar role.

There are many different ends for the continuous stream of history, and all these different directions cannot be explained by one formula. Yet it is not true that our actions are by our own free will directed toward this goal. We may strive in history for some definite end, and then something quite different results. History can only very seldom be planned. Bismarck planned in 1870—and before—to build a strong German empire by basing it entirely upon the military power of Prussia and by excluding the Hapsburg monarchy. What the iron chancellor wanted was not

achieved, but rather the contrary. Bismarck's planning proved to be futile. It cannot be said that all planning in history has shared the fate of Bismarck's policy. Caesar and his adopted son Augustus were much more successful. They built an organization of the Roman empire which lasted for four centuries. Yet there is no certainty about the value of our actions in future times. We do not know whether our aim will be reached or, in some strange and very devious way, an entirely different goal. It seems that there is a direction in history which is only partly planned by ourselves.

Direction and continuity are possible only if human actions in many generations and many countries are linked together. Human power is generally insufficient to create this unity of action. Under these circumstances, it is quite understandable that mystical and metaphysical explanations have been proposed for understanding the existence of continuity and direction. The German romanticism, as seen in Savigny and his school, believed that historical trends are somewhat like a flower which grows and blossoms.¹ Historical institutions develop in an organic way. This is poetry but no explanation. Vico saw in the cohesion of different actions the work of divine Providence. The writer of this article personally shares the opinion of Vico; yet before this continuity of human actions is explained with the help of metaphysics and theology, the attempt ought at least to be made to find the required explanation in human action itself.

Here we run into serious difficulties.

Human action contains continuity and direction. On the other hand the persons whose actions create continuity and direction are separated from each other by time and space. The discrepancy of continuity and separation is not a construction of thinking, it exists in real life. We all feel that we are living in the tradition of our country, our home town, and our family; we are members of institutions created by history; on the other hand, we are separated in mind and body from every other human being. This puzzle can find its solution only because the separated individuality is often nothing but an illusion. Men think they do not conform, and yet they act almost as if they were coming out of the same cast. This conformity has a spiritual character, because it is rooted in man's judgment on good and evil, beautiful and ugly, the profitable and unprofitable. Man's pattern of convictions is not his own creation. This tenet has a universal character because education by school, family, church, friends, community and state scatters the seeds of common conviction over all the members of this society. At the same time this conviction has a traditional character; education transfers the pattern of a spiritual attitude from one generation to the next. This spiritual tradition is the chain which binds together different generations and different countries. The spiritual heritage is the second factor on which a comparison of societies is founded. On account of its significance for the comparison, it is necessary to give a farther-reaching explanation of these traditional convictions.

The spiritual tradition of a whole society is its religion, as Toynbee and, long before him, Vico, have pointed out.

¹ Erich Rothacker, *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, Tübingen, 1930, pp. 62 ff.

Vico² called it "the myth," and this term will be accepted by us, because it is more suitable than the word "religion." The word religion cannot be separated from the articles of faith and from the theology of the learned. The Viconian myth is not an abstract theory; rather it is an imaginative and emotional dream, where only the picturesque figures of the religious legend stand out clearly. This myth is the faith of young societies, where people do not think but dream, where events and persons become allegories and symbols, where disharmonies and tensions inside a society are changed into a war between the friend, the saint, and the god against the enemy, demon, or devil.

So far Vico. Yet this is not all that can be said about the myth. The myth is not only the beginning of a new society, it stays with a civilization from the beginning to the end. Men need answers for the final questions of ethics, politics, society. The answers are found in the religious tales. We may not always realize that the religious education given us in our early youth furnishes the answer. Deep hidden in our soul is a recollection of those stories. "The echoes are in us of great voices long gone hence." We may ostensibly no longer believe in God or in the Bible, we may be freethinkers by faith, socialists or conservatives according to our political

conviction. Yet all these programs and tenets are thoroughly impregnated by our Jewish-Christian tradition. Dawson has noted the inner connection between Marxism and our myth.³ Even Marx, who claimed to be irreligious and revolutionary, could not separate himself from the myth of his civilization. Other teachers, philosophers, statesmen, who have a stronger feeling for their tradition, are still more strongly influenced by their religious inheritance.

The myth creates continuity and direction in history. Continuity exists because one generation after another is influenced by the same myth. Direction exists because the symbols and allegories of the religious tales foreshadow the problems, tensions, cultural achievements of future times. The innate tendencies of the myth are developed by the thinking and feeling of the following generations. Consequences are drawn, ideals are created. Christ teaches the infinite value of every person. Modern democracy is a consequence of this tenet: equality, brotherhood, and freedom must be granted to persons who have been granted this eminence before God. The modern labor disputes are also imbued with the dogma of human dignity. Modern pacifism finds its origin in the prophecies of Isaiah as well as in the teachings of the Gospel. Thus the ideals and problems of our own time can be traced back to the myth at the beginning of our civilization.

² About the myth, see Giambattista Vico, *La scienza nuova*, Giusta l'edizione, 1744; Bari, Laterza, Vol. I, 1911; Vol. II, 1913. See esp. Vol. I, p. 212. Georges Sorel, *Reflection on Violence*, translated by Hume, New York, 1912, pp. 12-33. Eric Voegelin, "The Theory of Legal Science," *Louisiana Law Review*, Vol. IV, especially pp. 567-569. Ernst Bertram, *Nietzsche, Versuch einer Mythologie*, Berlin, 1929, pp. 9-15, 18. Nicholas Berdyaev, *The Meaning of History*, London, 1936, p. 21.

³ "Behind the hard rational surface of Karl Marx's materialist and socialist interpretation of history, there burns the flame of an apocalyptic vision. For what was that social revolution in which he put his hope, but a nineteenth century version of the Day of the Lord . . .?" Christopher Dawson, *Enquiries into Religion and Culture*, New York, 1934, p. 111.

II. The myth gives continuity and direction to human action. Myth and human action are the two elements which make comparisons possible. These elements are eternal. The historical trend which is set in motion by these two elements has the chance of repeating itself indefinitely. That part of history which is so motivated shall be called, using a Viconian expression, the *ideal history*: ". . . Una storia ideal eterna sopra la quale corrono in tempo le storie di tutte le nazioni. . . ." ⁴ The eternal history is at the basis of every comparison between civilizations. The moments of this ideal history can be used to measure the distance a civilization has gone and still has to go in the future. The ideal history is the hour-glass of civilization. The eternal history has to be separated from the empirical civilization. A book written on a topic of the empirical civilization contains all the moments which occur in reality. A historian writing about the ideal history describes only the development and the decay of the myth.

The ideal history and the history of the myth are the same. Man uses the motives of his myth to gain an understanding of the world in which he lives, he exhausts the raw material of the myth to formulate his understanding of the universe. Construction and destruction are here inseparable. In the beginning of the cycle, man tries to orient himself in the foggy atmosphere of the myth. Later he attempts to separate truth and fiction in the religious tales, and this intellectual process leads to the formation of dogmatic theology and, later, of critical philosophy. In the end, man mistrusts his own rational cre-

ations and his thinking disintegrates into skepticism. This negative skepticism destroys the very foundation on which the intellectual construction of the civilization has been based. The cycle comes to a close.

The spiritual development from myth to skepticism has far reaching repercussions on human action. Members of a young civilization have a strong urge to follow the narrow path taught as the correct way of living in the holy legends. "And they immediately left the ship and their father, and followed him." ⁵ So they become saints, martyrs, fanatics, while the majority of those who are too indolent or too egotistical become dejected sinners. During the following centuries the group of militant followers dwindles away, the army of not-so-repentant sinners increases. The commands of the myth are no longer self-evident.

The decay of the myth paralyzes that human activity which builds up and strengthens a civilization. When all the ideas hidden in the original legends have been explained, the schools of the philosophers, painters, and sculptors are deserted; when all the ideals which are preached in the legends come to be considered illusory no martyr will die and no warrior will courageously fight. It is the end. A barren society waits for some barbarians who will sweep it with all its faded glitter from the surface of the earth.

This is the last phase of the ideal history. It ends only to start again with a new civilization. The decay of the myth is a pattern woven into every civilization. Here is the *tertium comparationis* which makes it possible to draw

⁴ Vico, *lib. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 21.

⁵ St. Matthew 4: 22.

parallels. These analogies must agree with the character of the ideal history which is tantamount to the structure of development and decay. Therefore the comparisons must be related to the growth and decline of every civilization. The historian who is hunting for comparable facts in the different waves is really seeking landmarks of development, i.e. points where a new phase of development starts. Such a landmark, according to Vico, is the moment when Dante in the Christian era and Homer during the classical period give the myth its poetical form. Here Vico has found a moment which has the chance of being repeated in every cycle. Not always were the builders of the wave theory as lucky as Vico in his comparison of Dante and Homer. The history of the wave theory, like the history of every other research, is composed of trial and error; accordingly it is self-evident that not every discovery of an analogy has proved to be correct. The well-known Platonic cycle of political systems (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and tyranny) can be found only in the classical and in the Christian periods. It is not a development found in every civilization.

Analogies accepted in the wave theory ought to have a chance of reappearing in many civilizations, for otherwise the drawing of parallels degenerates into a parlor game. It must be kept in mind that the results gained from comparisons can never provide historical laws in the strict sense, i.e. statements of invariable sequence between specified events, but only tendencies which indicate possibilities, not necessities. Every author who constructs different phases of the cycle uses empirical events, institutions, situations which can—but need

not necessarily—reappear. Therefore his constructions have no inner necessity. Only one thing is universal and necessary, viz. that civilizations live and die, because the myth disintegrates. But the ideal history is such a broad concept that without adding empirical material almost no conclusions can be drawn for the purpose of historical research. Yet two deductions open to discussion can be derived from the ideal history. It seems as if the decay of the myth destroys free will and progress. The following paragraphs will show whether these deductions are conclusive.

1. *Freedom of Decision.* To all appearances, free will and the myth cannot exist together. Man can only unfold the thoughts which are contained in his mythical dreams. He cannot create anything alone. It is true that man can only develop those ideas which in their embryonic form are already contained in the myth. Yet even this does not exclude free will. Only general outlines and directions are given in the myth; the more we go into detail, the more the creative spirit prevails over the general inheritance. By keeping open a place for the action of free will, the problem is not simplified but becomes even more complicated. In place of the old alternative, free will *or* necessity, is substituted a synthesis of free will *and* necessity. Long-term developments are firmly established by the ideal history, but the details of historical developments can be changed very arbitrarily by the creative freedom of personalities. Statesmen and the good will of the people may be able to create an international understanding which will last for some time. Yet this improvement of the political situation cannot

last forever; the greatest triumphs of statesmanship cannot turn away the inevitable end of this civilization. What has been stated here does not give a clear answer to the questions: Where does freedom begin? Where does necessity end? These questions cannot find any answers. In every action, determined and undetermined moments seem to be intermingled. This puzzling situation is not due to the wave theory or to history as such. The same situation prevails in the abstract realm of philosophy, where freedom cannot be abolished by necessity. It is a consequence of the fact that freedom of will is not a construction of our mind but a basic experience of our life.

We must be honest and admit this contradiction which cannot be overcome within the sphere of pure logic. This difficulty, however, does not exist for the religious mind. Christian theology claims that one who is chosen for the state of grace is able to break or, at least, to twist the chain of necessity. Troeltsch has said that history without selection, predestination, and grace is not conceivable.⁶ However, predestination is both a blessing and a curse. The mantle of the prophet lies heavy on the shoulders of those who are chosen. Their unclean lips are purified with the live coal. The chosen man still faces the impact of iron necessity.

2. Progress. The idea of progress and the principle of the wave theory seem to be incompatible. The defenders of progress in history believe in one mankind. The defenders of the wave theory, especially Spengler and Toynbee, deny or at least doubt that mankind is

the universal all-embracing group of human beings; they consider the different civilizations to be the final groups in history which cannot be melted into one mankind. The philosophers of progress face the chaos of political experience with the soul-stirring conviction that our world will improve materially, socially, and morally. The defenders of the wave theory face the turmoil of history with the statement that every civilization develops and breaks down. If we ask the supporters of progress for the reason of their optimism they will give different answers according to their background. They may hold that human beings are capable of an all-round perfection. They may be convinced that God in his kindness will not lead His flock astray but must improve their lot. The spiritual background is a humanistic or atheistic faith in perfectionism.

The wave theory, in contrast to the faith in progress, cannot be connected with any outspoken conviction. The repetition of history can be taught as a result of philosophical nihilism (Spengler) or of divine guidance (Joachim of Flora, Vico). Blind fate, or the Lord in His wisdom, rebuilds the world again and again. A pessimistic or an optimistic undertone can prevail throughout the description of the cycle. The author can either view the ruins and the dust that will ultimately remain from any civilization, or he can paint only the glamor and the glory to which many civilizations are entitled. Such a description would even be compatible with the faith in progress. Only the out-and-out pessimist believes that the concept of progress is at variance with the principle of a repeating history. There are elements of progress in the wave theory. The origin of the myth cannot

⁶ Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*. Tübingen, 1922, p. 101.

be explained without the idea of progress. Myths are very often the cultural heritage of older civilizations which survive the breakdown, even the complete disappearance, of their own society in the form of legendary dreams. So the Greek mythology has apparently conserved some of the ideas which originated in earlier Minoan and Cretan society. The narrators of the Gospels have handed down the decisive ideas of Hellenic and Graeco-Oriental civilization to a posterity of European nations. So it may be that not everything which has been thought or created will be thrown on the rubbish pile of a forgetful history. It seems that many cycles inherit some of the ideas left to them from other civilizations. That does not mean that new societies start at the point where the dying civilization left off. With the end of an old and the beginning of a new cycle, a marked de-

cline is always connected. It lasts for centuries, and longer, till the barbarians who have inherited the old ideas can grasp the value of their inheritance. It remains always a question of circumstances whether a new society will reach or even overreach the mark set in justice, moral attitude, art, literature, music, by an older civilization. Only if a new civilization has set a higher mark in the field of all cultural achievements than that of its predecessors, can we speak of progress. So the reflux theory does not exclude progress. New cycles *may*, yet do not necessarily, bring progress to mankind. Therefore we should not expect progress as a promised gift but as a special grace. We have to learn that the holidays and the catastrophes of history must be faced with an even temper. To teach this composure is one of the main tasks of those who write about repetition in history.

LIGHT FROM PAUL ON GOSPEL ORIGINS

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It is the purpose of this paper to examine the letters of Paul for any evidence they may throw upon the general question of Gospel origins. Does Paul imply or reflect in any way that he knew written Gospels, or does he so far as he speaks imply that he was in touch with a living stream of tradition which for him had not yet been cast into written form? What does he know of Gospel material, and whence is his information derived? It will be of value to recognize that in presenting this material we are not dealing with the main interest in the Pauline letters. Such references on the point of our present interest as they may contain are for the very large part incidental. But Paul is an important independent witness, and so far as possible the evidence we may find will be presented as if we had no other information as to the facts attested by this Pauline testimony.

When we examine Paul's writings for information on the general life and ministry of Jesus we find a very small amount of material. As to the early life of Jesus we learn the meager facts that he was of the nation Israel and the seed of Abraham to whom the promise of God had been originally given,¹ and was born under the law as were all Jews.² He was also of the house of David, to whom the promise of a line of royal succession had been given.³ He belonged in a family in which there were several

brothers⁴ one of whom was named James.⁵ Of these brothers at least one, James, attained some recognition in the Church, becoming one of the most prominent leaders in the church of Jerusalem.⁶ Colossians 2: 11 has been thought by some to reflect the fact of the circumcision of Jesus, but whatever the facts of the case may be, Colossians furnishes no information. The phrase "born of woman" in Galatians 4: 4⁷ when examined in the light of the usage of the phrase elsewhere⁸ furnishes no information beyond the fact of the birth of Jesus. It is, however, abundantly clear that Paul thought of Jesus as a personality of unique significance and of divine relationship;⁹ Jesus had become for him the *Lord* Jesus Christ.

Concerning the general course of the ministry of Jesus we are given almost no information. It seems correct to understand Romans¹⁰ as saying that the personal ministry of Jesus was among the Jews. From I Thessalonians¹¹ it also appears that Judea was the scene of his labors and remained so to the time of his death. A group known as apostles sustained a special relation to

⁴ I Cor. 9: 5.

⁵ Gal. 1: 19.

⁶ Gal. 2: 9, 12.

⁷ Gal. 4: 4; cf. I Cor. 15: 21; Rom. 8: 15.

⁸ Job 14: 1; 15: 14; 25: 4; Matt. 11: 11; Luke 7: 28.

⁹ Gal. 4: 4; I Cor. 8: 5, 6; II Cor. 5: 19; 8: 9; 11: 31; Rom. 1: 3, 4; 8: 3; Phil. 2: 5-10, are especially important passages.

¹⁰ Rom. 15: 8.

¹¹ I Thess. 2: 14, 15.

¹ Gal. 3: 16; Rom. 9: 3-5.

² Gal. 4: 4, 5.

³ Rom. 1: 3; 15: 12.

him.¹² There was also a group known as The Twelve,¹³ but what if any relation existed between the two groups is not disclosed. Cephas and James were the names of two of Jesus' most intimate disciples and associates.¹⁴ At the time of the death of Jesus the total number of his disciples exceeded five hundred.¹⁵ At the very close of his life, during a meal after nightfall, in the company of some of his followers, Jesus had instituted what had come to be known as the Lord's Supper which he intended should be perpetuated as a memorial of him,¹⁶ and whose meaning he had explained in certain teachings.¹⁷

The death of Jesus occupies a much larger place in the letters of Paul than any other topic of his entire life, with a total of sixty-five passages or more, depending upon the method of dividing the sentences. In a large majority of the cases the fact of the death is assumed, its significance being the point of interest. However, a few historical particulars are mentioned. We are told that he was killed by the Jews,¹⁸ and by implication in Judea. The statement that Christ our Passover was sacrificed for us,¹⁹ does not of necessity mean that the death took place at the time of the slaying of the Passover though many think it does so imply. It is clearly stated that Jesus was betrayed,²⁰ but by

whom, when, where, under what circumstances is not said. Paul however assumes that it was a fact, that it took place at night, that it was the same night as that on which he instituted the Lord's Supper, and that the Corinthians had been made acquainted with these facts when Paul had preached among them. That the death was by crucifixion is the point most frequently mentioned—more than twenty times.²¹ This was a Roman method of execution and it is thus probable that "the rulers of the world who crucified the Lord of Glory"²² included in the mind of Paul Romans as well as Jews. In one passage²³ we are told, what might very well be taken for granted, that Jesus was buried. This fact is also clearly implied in Paul's discussion of baptism as symbolic burial and resurrection.²⁴ Next to the death of Jesus the resurrection is most frequently referred to with a total of more than thirty passages. For our present purpose the most important passage is the discussion in the 15th chapter of I Corinthians.²⁵ We have here the declaration that he rose the third day, a fact stated in no other place in Paul's letters. We are also given a list of six appearances of the Lord after his resurrection. It is beyond dispute that we do not have this list duplicated elsewhere. Paul must have derived his statements in part, at least, from some source not otherwise or elsewhere reported.

¹² Gal. 1: 19; I Cor. 15: 7.

¹³ I Cor. 15: 5.

¹⁴ Gal. 1: 19; I Cor. 15: 5, 7.

¹⁵ I Cor. 15: 6.

¹⁶ I Cor. 11: 23-26.

¹⁷ Eph. 2: 17 is of uncertain meaning and should not be depended upon for the conceptions we are presenting.

¹⁸ I Thess. 2: 14, 15.

¹⁹ I Cor. 5: 7.

²⁰ I Cor. 11: 23.

²¹ See especially, Gal. 2: 20; 3: 1; 5: 11; 6: 12, 14; I Cor. 1: 13; 1: 17; 1: 23; 2: 2; 2: 8; 10: 16; 11: 25; II Cor. 13: 4; 4: 10; Rom. 3: 25; 5: 9; Phil. 2: 8; 3: 18; Col. 1: 20; 2: 14; Eph. 1: 17; 2: 13, 16.

²² I Cor. 2: 6, 8.

²³ I Cor. 15: 3.

²⁴ Rom. 6: 3, 4; Col. 2: 12.

²⁵ I Cor. 15: 5-8.

Paul also taught a *parousia*, or future return of the Lord, in the general frame of his inherited Jewish eschatology. However in I Thessalonians, II Thessalonians, and I Corinthians Paul sets up certain conceptions which are distinctly referred to a primitive Christian tradition.²⁶ In I Corinthians 15: 28 he declares a status for Christ in the future which had no parallel anywhere else in early Christian literature.

We turn from the life of Jesus to his teaching. One of our older scholars who gave this matter very careful consideration²⁷ pointed out more than one hundred passages in the letters of Paul which he thought reflect the teaching of Jesus. These are not all of equal clearness or certainty and some of them would be denied by other scholars. But in addition to these allusions which are more or less intangible and in part a matter of atmosphere and tone there are certain specific passages in which the knowledge of the teaching of Jesus is reflected in a very definite form. The statement in Galatians²⁸ "bear ye one another's burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ," should almost certainly be understood of the teaching of Jesus himself as this had come to the knowledge of Paul. In his discussion of the marriage question, raised in a letter from the Corinthian Christians, Paul gives certain specific advice upon the basis of his own judgment with the explicit declaration that he is not basing it upon

any teaching of the Lord.²⁹ But on another point what he has to say is just as explicitly based upon "the commandment of the Lord." "But unto the married give I charge; not I, but the Lord."³⁰ Inasmuch as he gives his own teaching in both cases, and believes that he expresses the mind of the Spirit of God in so doing,³¹ there is no natural explanation of his reference to the commandment of the Lord except as specific appeal to the teaching of Jesus himself on the point under discussion. In defending his conduct among the Corinthians in not asking them for support, he says, "Even so did the Lord ordain that they who proclaim the gospel should live of the gospel"³²—an explicit statement of both the teaching and its source. It is apparently this principle which is in his mind as he discusses the same subject in his first letter to the Thessalonians.³³ The statement in Romans³⁴ that he knows and is persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself is a clear reflection of his knowledge of the teaching of Jesus on things clean and unclean. Paul's command to the Thessalonians³⁵ "in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ to separate yourselves from every brother that is walking disorderly and not according to the tradition which ye received from us" is to be understood as an appeal to the word and authority of Jesus.

The most definite and extended quotation of the words of Jesus is found in

²⁶ I Cor. 7: 12, 13; 7: 25.

²⁷ I Cor. 7: 10, 11; cf Matt. 5: 32; 19: 2; Mark 10: 11, 12; Luke 16: 18.

²⁸ I Cor. 7: 25, 40.

²⁹ I Cor. 9: 14.

³⁰ I Thess. 2: 6.

³¹ Rom. 14: 14.

³² II Thess. 3: 6.

²⁶ I Thess. 4: 13-18; II Thess. 2: 16; 3: 6; I Cor. 15: 3-11.

²⁷ Titius, *Lehre von der Seligkeit*, II, pp. 8-22; Resch thought there were a thousand such passages.

²⁸ Gal. 6: 2.

the passage, to which we referred above, in which Paul describes the institution of the Lord's Supper.³⁶ He reports words of Jesus as having been used "on the night in which he was betrayed." In these words Jesus gives interpretation of the ceremonial which he institutes. The account as Paul gives it cannot be derived in full from any other account we have.

There are several other passages in Paul's letters whose bearing upon the point now under consideration is disputed. The "word of the Lord" upon which he bases his teaching in I Thessalonians concerning the rising of those who have fallen asleep³⁷ is believed by some interpreters to refer to a special revelation. Others refer it to a report of the teaching of Jesus coming to Paul in written form. An examination of Paul's use of the term "word" in this same letter strongly suggests that he is thinking of a teaching of Jesus embodied in tradition.³⁸ His statement

³⁶ I Cor. 11: 23-26.

³⁷ I Thess. 4: 15-17.

³⁸ In I Thess. 1: 8 Paul tells the Thessalonian Christians that from them "has sounded forth the word of the Lord." According to 2: 13 they had received from Paul a "*word of hearing*," which was received by them "not as a word of men, but as it indeed is, a word of God." In II Thess. 2: 2 and 2: 15 the "word" of the apostle as contrasted with a written form of the truth is distinctly indicated. It is hardly necessary to say that in each of these instances the word Paul used is the identical term found in 4: 15. In I Thess. 1: 5, 6 it is clearly said that the gospel came to them not in "word" only, but "in power," etc., and they had received it in much affliction. In 2: 5 he reminds them that he was not among them "with a word of flattery." That the "gospel" and the "word" are here not identical is quite clear, but the gospel truth or message has been de-

livered in spoken word. that the Thessalonians know "that the day of the Lord comes as a thief in the night"³⁹ and are able to build each other up by the truth, is in the light of the entire trend of discussion in the letter to be understood as a reference to a teaching of Jesus. The injunction to "let the word of Christ dwell in you richly in all wisdom,"⁴⁰ considered in relation to the entire context, is also a reference to the teaching of Christ in general.

The sum total of the impression resulting from this inspection of the letters of Paul is that he had fuller knowledge of the teaching of Jesus than he definitely makes use of in his writings, and that it forms background and presupposition for him in many things in which he makes no specific mention of it.

Somewhat distinct from these references to the teaching of Jesus are the indications of Paul's acquaintance with the mind and spirit of Jesus as exemplified in his own personal conduct. In the famous Christological passage in the 2nd chapter of Philippians⁴¹ Paul makes the mind of Christ the controlling standard for the conduct of the Phil-

livered in spoken word. In II Thess. 3: 1 the word of the Lord is closely related to, if not identical with, the gospel message, but still it is to "run" and be glorified, being orally proclaimed. In I Thess. 4: 18 and II Thess. 3: 14 the "word" or "words" are transmitted through the epistles of Paul as the written report of the message which he has to give.

In view of this evidence the most natural (if indeed not the only natural) understanding of the phrase "word of the Lord" in I Thess. 4: 15 is that it refers to an orally transmitted word which came down to the apostle by way of tradition as a word of the Lord Jesus.

³⁹ I Thess. 5: 2; cf. 5: 11.

⁴⁰ Col. 3: 16.

⁴¹ Phil. 2: 5-11.

ippian Christians. A considerable portion of the passage has no direct reference to the historical life of Jesus and cannot be used to describe it. But the whole passage is a unit, and a part of it does very definitely contemplate his career among men. Verses 5-7 give impressive expression to Jesus' spirit of humility. With this is also connected his obedience to the will of God which is set forth so strikingly in his going to death on the cross. It is quite evident that the apostle thinks of these two qualities of mind as being characteristic of the entire life of Jesus.

With this passage may be associated three others. In the first one⁴² Paul writes that the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ was expressed in the fact that "though he was rich yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might become rich." The act itself cannot be referred to the historical life of Jesus but the resulting condition is evidently conceived as belonging to his historical life.

The second passage⁴³ emphasizes the one act of obedience of Christ in contrast with the disobedience of Adam. The whole context makes clear that this obedience was thought of as coming to its fullness in his death. In this same passage there is also a second contrast—that between the one act of transgression of Adam and the one act of righteousness of Christ. The tone of the whole passage suggests that this act of righteousness was quite characteristic of the entire life. That which is clearly implied here is stated explicitly in the third of these passages⁴⁴: "Him who

knew no sin he made to be sin in our behalf that we might become the righteousness of God in him"; it is amply clear that apostle means this to be inclusive of the entire life of Jesus.

In Romans⁴⁵ we have the injunction to "put on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh to fulfill the lusts thereof"—a clear reflection of his thinking as to the mind of Jesus.

In two passages⁴⁶ we are reminded that it was the habit of Jesus to please not himself "but to seek the profit and edification of others." With this may be connected the statement⁴⁷ that the "bearing of one another's burdens is a fulfillment of the law of Christ." Not less significant is the appeal to the Corinthians⁴⁸ by the meekness and gentleness of Christ" for a satisfactory adjustment of the relations between them and the apostle himself. The love of Christ is apparently the characteristic which impresses the apostle most profoundly. He sees in it such depth of meaning and appeal, especially as expressed in the cross, that it challenges and secures the deep and grateful response of his soul.⁴⁹

When we examine Paul to see whether he gives us any clue or indication of the channels by which his information concerning Jesus came to him we find some interesting material. In three passages in his letters he speaks of certain traditions which he had delivered to his converts. In II Thessalonians⁵⁰ he writes: "God called you through our gospel.

⁴⁵ Rom. 13: 14.

⁴⁶ I Cor. 10: 32, 33; 11: 1.

⁴⁷ Gal. 6: 2.

⁴⁸ II Cor. 10: 1.

⁴⁹ Gal. 2: 20; 6: 14; II Cor. 5: 14, 15; Eph. 5: 2; 5: 25.

⁵⁰ II Thess. 2: 14, 15.

⁴² II Cor. 8: 9.

⁴³ Rom. 5: 17-19.

⁴⁴ II Cor. 5: 21.

Therefore stand fast and hold to the traditions which you were taught, whether by word, or by epistle of ours." In ⁵¹ 3: 6 he writes: "We enjoin (or pass on to) you in the name of the Lord to separate yourselves from everyone walking disorderly and not according to the tradition which you received."⁵² That he had talked of these matters to the Thessalonians as he was preaching among them is abundantly attested by his two letters.⁵³ In the 1st Corinthian letter he writes: "I praise you that you remember me in all things and hold fast the traditions according as I delivered them to you."⁵⁴

The word "traditions" which Paul employs in the three passages just mentioned is used by him in Galatians 1: 14 to refer to his ancestral traditions coming down from the past, and by the Gospels of Mark ⁵⁵ and Matthew ⁵⁶ "the traditions of the elders" are repeatedly mentioned in the report of the words of Jesus in criticism of the Pharisees. These traditions were transmitted orally from one generation to another. It is hardly possible that Paul is using the term—tradition—in any other sense. He is evidently thinking of certain Christian traditions which have come down to him from those who were Christians before him, which he also passed on to those whom he evangelized. The same idea seems to be reflected in Romans ⁵⁷ in the word "I beseech you brethren to keep an eye on those who are making the divi-

sions and scandals contrary to the teaching which you learned." Likewise the Philippians ⁵⁸ are enjoined: "What things you learned and received and heard and saw in me, these things do, and the God of peace shall be with you." So also he had taught the Thessalonians ⁵⁹ certain things about the future in continuation of the primitive Christian tradition which had come down to him from an earlier day.⁶⁰ The obvious implication of all these passages is rendered certain by two passages in which we have explicit statement on the point. In the passage which tells the story of the institution of the Lord's Supper⁶¹ Paul introduces it with the words, "I received from the Lord that which also I delivered unto you." He then goes on to give a statement concerning what was done on the night in which the Lord was betrayed. The two words which are translated "received" and "delivered"

⁵⁸ 4: 9.

⁵⁹ I Thess. 5: 2; II Thess. 2: 5.

⁶⁰ An examination of the teaching of Paul in the two Thessalonian letters in particular, and then a comparison of this material with that found in the sermons and speeches in the first half of the Book of Acts discloses very clearly that the lines of Paul's thinking are significantly parallel to the conceptions which Acts assigns to these primitive preachers. The sermon of Paul to the Jews in the synagogue in Antioch as reported in the 13th chapter of Acts is in impressive accord with the message which Paul himself indicates he had presented in Thessalonica. The testimony of Acts is clear, and the testimony of Paul is clear and its meaning beyond doubt. They both affirm the conformity of Paul with the Primitive Christian tradition known to him.

This fact has a bearing on the question of the authenticity of the representation of the Book of Acts as to the message of these primitive preachers. Paul and Acts agree—so far as either of them speaks—at that particular point.

⁶¹ I Cor. 11: 23-25.

⁵¹ II Thess. 3: 6.

⁵² Cf. Matt. 18: 17.

⁵³ I Thess. 2: 11, 12, 15; 4: 1-6, 11; II Thess. 3: 6; 3: 10.

⁵⁴ I Cor. 11: 2.

⁵⁵ 7: 1-13; cf. Col. 2: 8.

⁵⁶ 15: 1-10.

⁵⁷ 16: 17.

are the same as the two words used in the passage I Cor. 15: 3 which we are to discuss just below. This means that a part of the tradition which Paul had received, coming down from the Lord Himself, is here given. Paul knew that tradition from those who were preachers before him.

These things which he, Paul, had received from those with whom he had been in touch, he had already passed on to the Corinthian disciples. In I Corinthians,⁶² Paul writes that he had "delivered unto you (the Corinthians) among first things (*ἐν πρώτοις*) what also he had received." Further down in the chapter, at verse 11, he writes, "So then whether I or they, so we preach and so ye believed." As one examines this entire passage it becomes clear that Paul is thinking of a group of preachers who had preceded him in the ministry of the gospel. They and he held in common certain materials which both, they and he, preached. Just who these people were personally, he does not specifically say, and how large the group was, we have no way of determining. In verses 5 and 8 of the passage, he speaks of Peter and James, and the twelve, and then all the apostles, and then of a group of more than five hundred. How many of these, or precisely who of these, were in mind when he was speaking about the preaching we cannot be certain. It is clear, however, that Paul thought of these preachers as a group of apostles, at least in part, who were in possession of a body of tradition concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus which he also held in common with them. They were accustomed to preach these things which Paul himself

had in mind as he was writing this statement. From them Paul had received this body of tradition and had communicated it to the Corinthians in his preaching to them.⁶³

This statement of Paul is no contradiction of his statement in the letter to the Galatians that he had not received his gospel from men nor had he been taught it by any man. The body of tradition concerning the facts of Jesus' life and death was in general common to all members of the early church. The particular gospel of Paul had to do with his interpretation of the implications and application of these facts. He and Peter did not differ in respect to the facts of the life and ministry of the Lord; they differed in their understanding of these facts in relation to the bearing of the Law upon the lives of Jew and Gentile. God had, so it was finally decided, blessed the apostleship of Peter to the Jews and the apostleship of Paul to the Gentiles, and each of them should go on his own way within the fellowship of all. The repeated representations of all the letters of Paul and the letter to

⁶³ This interpretation of the passage, I Cor. 15: 3-11, is supported by Plummer, *Commentary on First Corinthians*, ad. I Cor. 11: 23; Taylor, Vincent, *The Formation of The Gospel Tradition*, pp. 48, 49. Hopwood, P. G. S., *The Religious Experience of The Primitive Church*, pp. 25-29: "Paul rests back on the Tradition of The Primitive Church." Dodd, C. H., *History and The Gospel*, pp. 62-68: "Paul rests on tradition." Taylor, *loc. cit.*, quotes Bussmann, *Synoptischen Studien*, I-III, 1925-31 (III, pp. 180-191), to the effect that in I Cor. 15: 3 the phrase "according to writings" does not have an article; hence it does not mean the Scriptures, but the "writings" of "certain passion narratives" known to Paul. As a matter of fact, the phrase does contain the article and hence is the customary form of reference to the Scriptures.

⁶² I Cor. 15: 3-11.

the Galatians in particular, concerning the points of dispute, are conclusively clear. The word which Paul uses in Galatians 1: 19 to describe his visit to Cephas, three years after his conversion, is a word which means "to visit for the sake of making personal acquaintance, or acquiring information." It is evident, then, that he visited Peter in Jerusalem, three years after his conversion, and on the same visit he had also seen James, the Lord's brother. The identification of these two men can hardly be a matter of doubt. The suggestion lies at hand that on the occasion of this visit Paul received a great deal of information from Peter—and James—and that they were two of the chief bearers of the traditions which Paul had received from those who were before him, which traditions came down from the Lord.

Paul's report in Galatians⁶⁴ of a Council in Jerusalem "fourteen years later" (than this visit?), is also illuminating and is corroborative of the information already derived from the passages above considered. He went up to Jerusalem that he "might place the gospel which he was preaching among the Gentiles" before them of repute lest by any means he should be running or had run in vain. These "reputed pillars" are specifically identified as "James and Cephas and John." It is clear that Paul has in mind a certain continuity of personal relationship between these leaders in the church in Jerusalem and the expanding gospel movement which made it necessary in the interest of freedom in the gospel to have this personal conference. This simply means that they and Paul possessed a common heritage of tradition

in the gospel, and that the standing of these men as the original holders and accepted authoritative voices in the tradition was the basis of Paul's appeal to them for the adjudication of the difference that had arisen between him and the "false brethren" who had come in to "spy out our liberty" in the gospel. In the light of his statements in I Corinthians⁶⁵ and the first chapter of Galatians, and the specific identification here of these leaders, the implications of his language are inevitable: Paul made appeal to these leaders in the church as late as the time of this conference for the reason that the tradition was still a living one, it was normative for both, and to it they both made appeal.

This testimony of Paul to the fact that he and those before him held a common historical tradition receives added significance when seen in the light of the relation of Paul to certain who were his opponents, who are reported to us in Second Corinthians. Once he speaks of them as "false apostles"⁶⁶ and twice in sarcasm he calls them "super-eminent apostles,"⁶⁷ evidently reflecting the claims which they made for themselves. It appears from his references to them that they were Hebrews,⁶⁸ who had appeared among the Corinthian Christians, bearing letters of recommendation;⁶⁹ that they claimed to have known Jesus personally,⁷⁰ and on the basis of this personal acquaintance they under-

⁶⁴ 2: 1-10.

⁶⁵ 15: 3-11.

⁶⁶ II Cor. 11: 13.

⁶⁷ II Cor. 11: 5; 12: 11.

⁶⁸ II Cor. 11: 22.

⁶⁹ II Cor. 3: 1.

⁷⁰ I Cor. 1: 12; II Cor. 5: 16; 11: 22.

took to introduce certain teachings⁷¹ which Paul regarded as false. The passage gives so much information and atmosphere that it may be quoted *in extenso*. We read:⁷² "I betrothed you as a pure virgin to present you to Christ. For, if the one coming to you preaches another Jesus whom we preached not, or ye receive another spirit which ye did not receive, or another gospel which ye did not get (from us) you bear it right nobly! For I reckon that I am in no wise inferior to these super-fine apostles. . . . For these such are false apostles, deceitful workers, 'masquerading as apostles of Christ.'" One naturally thinks in this connection of the Judaizers among the Galatians,⁷³ and those of the "concision" described in the Philippian letter.⁷⁴

Four things are obvious from Paul's discussion of these "false apostles." First, they claimed a special intimacy with, and knowledge of, the mind of and gospel of Jesus. They based their claims upon what they pretended to know by firsthand acquaintance and contact with the Lord. In the second place it is even more clear that Paul utterly denies their claims, and asserts that he nowise is and in no degree acknowledges that he is inferior to them. In the third place it is impressively clear that Paul affirms his firsthand authority as apostle by the direct contact he had with the Jesus not after the flesh. The Jesus he preaches is the Jesus that all must preach if they are to be true to the gospel. "Another Jesus" or "another spirit," or "another gospel" were

possible elements in the message which Paul connects with these false teachers. In the fourth place fair minded appraisal of the evidence reflected in this entire situation results in the overwhelming impression that we are here presented with a set of circumstances and conditions in which those who are moving in them think of themselves as in direct and living contact with a body of traditions about the Lord Jesus which are known to them in common. They are in conflict as to which of them has the better knowledge of him and his message, but they make no appeal to any source of information other than their own experiences and the traditions held by them in common. On these they severally rest their case.

In concluding our study it may be observed, first of all, that we have found the most significant testimony of Paul bearing upon the subject of our investigation in the Thessalonian and Corinthian letters. These letters, it should also be observed, are by general opinion among the earliest of Paul's writings. We are therefore tapping the testimony of the Apostle at the earliest recorded stages of its formation, when we study the evidence they contain. We are back at the point where the stream of primitive Christian tradition began to assume the special form and interpretation which it assumed in Paul's personal ministry. This fact accentuates the vividness and forcefulness of the evidence which Paul's letters supply.

We may summarize the conclusions to which we have been led in this study in the following statements:

1. Paul affirms repeatedly and clearly that his own testimony on certain points in his teaching is in direct continuity

⁷¹ II Cor. 10: 7; 11: 12, 13; 11: 18; 11: 22.

⁷² II Cor. 11: 2-5, 13.

⁷³ Gal. 1: 6-9; 2: 15, 16; 3: 1-5; 4: 8-10; 5: 2-12.

⁷⁴ Phil. 3: 2-4; cf. II Cor. 5: 16.

with primitive Christian tradition and in complete conformity with it.

2. He further asserts that he had received certain Christian traditions from those who were preachers before him, and that he had transmitted them to those to whom he had preached the gospel.

3. He appeals repeatedly to these traditions in seeking to broaden the support of his own message, and to influence the minds and conduct of those whom he had evangelized and to whom he was at the time writing.

4. His references to the "word of the Lord," the "commandment of the Lord," or "what Jesus said on the night in which he was betrayed," are by the contexts in which they are found seen to be most naturally, if not imperatively, interpreted as implying an oral tradition which had been received by him and by him transmitted to others.

5. In the very passage in which Paul most vividly and stoutly affirms the independence of his apostleship, and the directness and immediacy of the derivation of his gospel by revelation of Jesus Christ, he also affirms not only his contact with Peter and James, but also his appearance before these "reputed pillars" of the church in Jerusalem that the gospel which he was preaching "among the Gentiles might not be in vain." The immediacy of his apostleship, the independence of his gospel, the directness of his approach to the "pillars," and the denial of any claims of

superiority made by others over him, are all set out with explicit precision and emphasis.

6. In his conflicts with his opponents who claimed firsthand and direct personal contact with Christ as the basis of their authority and their priority of claim as apostles he still appeals to his own experiences and his personal contacts with the Lord. Each of the parties in contest rests his case upon the directness of his contact with the Lord. The community in which they are all at work, in which they are asserting their several contentions has a body of tradition, common to all, to which all make appeal, and on the basis of which they severally attempt to establish their individual claims and counter claims.

7. At no point in his letters in any set of circumstances is there any appeal to any written source or material other than the Scriptures, which are quoted by him in definitive phrase and clearness. If Paul knew of written gospel materials, he never by so much as a word says so. The only natural conclusion on the basis of the evidence is that he knew gospel material as living tradition.

8. As to the great historical tradition about the Lord Jesus which the primitive Christian Community possessed, Paul tapped the living stream. As to his interpretation of that great tradition in its meaning for both Jew and Gentile he stood on his own feet. He had that interpretation, his distinctive message, direct from Jesus Christ.

"A SPIRITUAL HOUSE AN HOLY PRIESTHOOD" (I Peter ii. 5)

By JOHN S. MARSHALL

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The glory of the New Testament is not least revealed in its vivid and significant imagery, an imagery that it never reduced to a single form of description, for the reason that the New Testament writers are not like modern popular writers or tired professors who hope to impress their readers by saying the same thing in the same way over and over again. The New Testament does deal with the same realities time and time again, but they are such tremendous realities, so rich, so full of grace and truth, that ever new figures are needed to bring them before us in all their character and worth. The writers of the New Testament are not so naive, so limited in method, so lacking in variety that they must confine themselves to single forms of figure or expression.

There is not merely one figure of our Lord but many: He is the Lamb, the Vine, the Way, the Truth, the Life, the Shepherd, the Corner Stone, the Judge, the Priest, the King. And there is not simply one way of describing the Church but many: it is the Bride of Christ, the Body of Christ, the Temple, a Spiritual House. The Church is too great a reality to be expressed by one figure, for it is like a mighty city which can be seen both from within and without and from many points within and without. Each of these descriptions brings before us some one of the many distinctive features of the divine *Ecclesia*, and each of them helps us to perceive just that aspect that we otherwise would fail to observe.

One way of describing the Church is that of a Temple composed of those who are fellow-citizens with the saints and built together into a habitation of God, a building whose corner stone is Jesus Christ.¹ Our Lord as the chief Corner Stone supports a new House of God where the Divine Presence is manifest as it never was in the tabernacle in the wilderness or in the temple at Jerusalem, for God is revealed in this new House in a unique manner, in a way which is only possible where the Temple is a living reality made up of the human lives dedicated to God Himself.

The Church is portrayed as a Temple or House of God not only in the Pauline writings but also in the Petrine, as the Dean of Winchester makes quite clear in his new commentary on *The First Epistle of St. Peter*.² According to this *Epistle* the Spiritual House which is the Church is a living House made up of the whole community built on Jesus Christ as their foundation; it is a Temple composed of the whole group of those who gather together in their Lord's name and find their common meaning in His presence in the midst of them. But more than that, they are the place where there is praise and that service which accompanies true praise, for they are the locus, the place of the joint-offering made up of spiritual sacrifice. Thus, the Church is itself a Priesthood of Sacrifice, and of Sacrifice because the Temple as a priesthood is built on Jesus

¹ Eph. 2: 19-22.

² Selwyn, Edward Gordon, *The First Epistle of St. Peter*, London: Macmillan, 1946.

Christ Himself as its Corner Stone. The Living Temple, the Spiritual House, is the union of many lives into one Priesthood because our Lord is the Priest and upon Him the House is built.

The Church is a Priesthood because, according to our *Epistle*, the people of God are sanctified, cut off from the rest of the world. They form a unity through their Lord, but a peculiar kind of unity that through its priestly vocation is cut off from those not of itself, and yet not so distinctly that there is no contact with the world, for the Church is severed from the world only to sanctify itself and prepare itself for the redemption of the world. The Church is a Royal Priesthood and hence its life is from its Lord and through Him it takes on its priestly character.

Our Lord is the Priest *par excellence* and hence His is the basic, the primary sacrifice; and we as living parts of His Spiritual House or Temple are a Royal Priesthood and share with Him His sacrifice. In part we share with Him by a sacrifice of obedience, of the endurance of grief, of suffering wrongly; but we also share with Him in the sacrifice of the Eucharist in which the Church as a worshipping Community participates in the priestly act of our Lord's atoning work. The Eucharist is thus a corporate priestly act, and the whole Church is a Priesthood.

If the whole Church is a Priesthood, then the Eucharist is offered up by the Church in its entirety rather than by a limited group within it.² It is the Church that is the Temple; it is the Church that is the Body of Christ; it is the Church that is the Bride, and hence it is the Church that endows the Ministry with its priestly functions and

not the Ministry who give the Church their sacerdotal character. That does not mean that the Priesthood of the clergy is not real, for it is real because the priestly character of the Church is real. The Minister of the Sacraments as an officiant of the Church is a Priest, because he, in the name of the Church, is the celebrant of the Divine Mysteries, and as such is a true priest, a Priest of the Church, but not a Priest apart from the Church.

With this conception of the Church as a Priesthood, we can face the most recent historical research with calm and complete confidence, even when it seems to indicate the threefold Ministry gradually developed in the Church instead of being present in it from the beginning, for whether the developed Ministry existed in the New Testament Church or not, is not of primary concern to the follower of the Petrine view. There was a priestly function in the Early Church just because the Church was a Temple, was a center of the Eucharist as well as of instruction, and hence it was inevitable that a sacerdotal Ministry should arise. The Priesthood of the clergy was implicit in the priesthood of the Church. But there may very well have been an evolution of ministerial orders, and with this evolution the distinctive functions of the Ministry may have gradually been assigned to the distinct orders. When the different Orders of the Ministry did develop, each of them, however, had its own validity, for each of them had been present in embryo from the beginning, and each of them had its own validity derived through the Church from our Lord Himself, for He as the High Priest, the Shepherd and Bishop of our souls, has ever been sacrificially present in that Spiritual House which is God's Holy Temple.

² *Ibid.*, p. 297.

A NOTE ON ABELARD

By W. NORMAN PITTENGER

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This note does not claim to consider Abelard's entire position on the Atonement but to make some points which have not often been noted in recent discussions. There are occasional suggestions in Abelard's writings of wider ranges of Atonement theology than the "Aberlardian theory" often seems to cover; these, however, are too slight to make any fundamental difference in his position.

It is safe to assume that the *main trend* of Abelard's atonement doctrine is sufficiently represented by such a sentence as the following: "To us it appears that we are . . . justified in the blood of Christ and reconciled to God by this singular grace exhibited to us in that his Son took our nature, and in it took upon himself to instruct us alike by word and example even unto death, [and so] bound us to himself by love; so that kindled by so great a benefit of divine grace, charity should not be afraid to endure anything for his sake; which benefit indeed we do not doubt kindled the ancient fathers also, who expected this by faith, unto a supreme love of God no less than the men of [this] time."

This would seem to indicate, plainly enough, that Abelard regarded the Atonement as meaning that by the life and death of the Son of God, seen by men as displaying the love of God, the human race is won back to the Father. In fact it is an assertion, like that of St. Augustine, that there is no greater invitation to love than to be the first in

loving. Abelard criticizes severely the older views on the Atonement; he can find nothing of value in what he regards as the commercial teaching of Anselm, the notion of corporate humanity which was stressed by the earlier Fathers, and the idea of a guilt which affected men in such a way that only death could remove it and that the death of the Son of God.

Although he is thus critical of other theories, and although his own special interest is rather in the moral effects of the Atonement, it must be pointed out that Abelard himself occasionally expresses views along the older lines. For instance, he comments in one place on the fact that the goodness of Christ increases the wickedness of the devil, thus making the latter's condemnation more serious. There are also several phrases about merit, satisfaction for sins, and demand for justice by God, which would appear to be inconsistent with his main position.

But his positive doctrine, while of very high *ethical* quality, seems to lack the element that is particularly needed to express the full Christian conviction concerning that which Christ has actually done for men. "Our redemption," he writes, "is that supreme love of Christ shown to us by his passion, which not only frees us from slavery to sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God." This is true: yet does his own doctrine really give an adequate basis for this new relationship between God and men? does it really get something

established in the realm of essential being, or is it only a matter of moral influence?

It is difficult to answer these questions briefly, but some comments may be made. In the first place, it is not fair to say that Abelard has no God-ward emphasis in his doctrine. The Incarnate Son offers on behalf of men that which they could not give themselves; he offers prayer, obedience and love towards God, says Abelard. He makes it possible for men to offer these too; he does this by awakening in them a similar love, as they contemplate his life and the death which focuses that life. Here is moral influence, and perhaps something more. But Abelard has not gone on to see that Christ gives to men new life, life which is indeed instinct with love but which is more than the ethical quality itself, and that it is this new life which makes their response a possibility.

Again, we must say on Abelard's behalf that the common criticism that the Incarnation is not required in his theory is utterly mistaken. If Christ is only a good man, dying for an ideal, then he is a tragic figure and not the great conqueror. Apart from the belief that in some inextricable even if inexplicable way God and man are united in the person of Christ, the life and death of Christ would and could have no such significance as Abelard would attach to them. He himself makes his Atonement theory hang upon the Incarnation, for he says: "The purpose and cause of the incarnation was that God might illuminate the world by his wisdom and excite it to the love of himself."

A really fundamental objection to the Abelardian theory is that it is largely, if not entirely, a matter of "showing." The Incarnation is done

as a sort of drama, and the Atonement is the result of seeing this play. God puts on a show which, when seen and appreciated by men, effects their lives significantly. There is much truth in this idea, but it is not the whole truth or even the larger part of the truth. Did not the Greek Fathers come nearer the facts when they claimed that by God's intimate union of himself with humanity in Christ, there entered into the race a new power which raised men to a level of life that made them potential sharers in the divine nature? Moral power comes as the result of that participation, when it is consciously apprehended by men; but it is secondary to the initial fact.

Is it not dangerous to lay so much stress upon the historic Jesus as is done by Abelard? What of the vast numbers of men who have never known that figure? Did the Incarnation and Atonement have no benefit for them? Catholic theology has always felt that it did; that an objectively new relationship between God and man was established by the events of Bethlehem and Calvary, and that it is into *conscious* realization of that relationship that the preaching of Christ in his Church calls us. The relationship is always there, whether we apprehend it or not; and it is a relationship which is more than moral—it is, so to say, biological; and more, it is ontological—*seinsverhältniss*, as the Germans would put it.

Perhaps the fundamental weakness of the Abelardian theory is that it at any rate *seems* to make man's salvation depend on man's own efforts, following upon his own recognition of God's goodness, rather than upon a victory already won, into which he can enter by those qualities which we have mentioned.

Man's appropriation of the benefits made available by Christ does depend, for its full realization, on his acceptance of Christ and his assimilation of the moral quality of Christlikeness. But the benefits are *there*; they are already achieved, for Christ is not merely *crucifixus*, he is *victor*, and as *victor* he is *regnans*. As King, Christ is established Lord of the world; he does not become Lord as we accept him.

Any satisfactory doctrine of the Atonement must find not merely an action of Deity upon man which calls

forth an answering love; it must also maintain an action of man towards God, performed by God in man and as man, doing towards God that which man cannot do for himself, and doing it as representative of the whole race, thereby establishing a new relationship for the race between God and man, in which all men may consciously share because it is an actual fact. How all these emphases are to be maintained and balanced is another matter. But Abelard seems to slight some of the more important of them.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Genius of Public Worship. By Charles H. Heimsath. New York: Scribners, 1944, pp. xvi + 204. \$2.50.

Dr. Heimsath has compressed into 196 pages a series of descriptions and appraisals of public worship forms and ceremonies, with interpretations and comments, that make lively reading. An idea of the scope of his work may be obtained from the following list (not exhaustive) of his topics: ceremonial; patterns; subjectivity and objectivity; worship as practised by Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers; the arts; the modern in worship. He tries throughout, as did Evelyn Underhill in her masterpiece, to report on each type of worship with sympathy, as if from inside; and in this he is mainly successful, though at times his brevity results in what some might object to as a lack of proportion. However, as no two Lutherans would give exactly the same account of their own way of worship, and no two Presbyterians, and so on, this can hardly be counted as a weakness in the book. In the chapter on The Episcopal Ceremonial, the author in a half-dozen pages hits off our variegated situation with considerable insight.

The most interesting chapters in the book are the last three, wherein Dr. Heimsath discusses Worship and Education, and the New Worship in the New World. Taking stock of current revivals, movements, and reforms, he enters vigorously the debate as to the relative

virtues of a modern *versus* an ancient vocabulary, and as to the places we should assign to such values as tradition, beauty of expression, the sense of actuality, themes and expressions which "stab us awake," etc. "Indeed," he says, "let us take full account of the poetry of Sandburg, of the music of Gershwin, and of the architecture of Andrew Reboni. Look upon the sharp brilliance of the neon signs, the magnificent flight of transoceanic clippers, the splendor of Rockefeller Center, the white grace of paratroopers descending, the smooth beauty of a great machine. Let the worshipper sense the fresh vigor and the full variety of the new world about him because in it are the new expressions of all the old meanings of the race. . . ."

"The worship of the church will come into the future like the traveller from a distant land, bearing among his treasures gifts old and new. We may expect that the gems from the treasuries of Christian devotion will be given modern settings, the pictures reframed in contemporary mouldings, the ceremonials recast upon the living stage of each succeeding generation. . . ."

"Worship is rooted in but not throttled by the past. It is not circumscribed as the antiquarian interest of a collector of rare objects, but it is unconfined as the creative vocation of a man who has discovered the fullness of life."

JOHN W. SUTER

Washington Cathedral

The Divine Action. By W. Norman Pittenger.
Hartford, Conn.: Church Congress, 1946,
pp. 48. \$0.25.

Here, in small compass, is a summary of the best thinking accumulating in our day on the rediscovered concept of the Church as the mystical Body of Christ. It makes condensed reading. Indeed, one of the few justifiable formalistic criticisms of the book would be that it compresses too much and lacks illustration. Laymen may find it not too easy. Yet condensation is also a virtue. A rich exposition of the doctrine of the Church as this is symbolized in the action of the Eucharist lies before us in this Church Congress pamphlet.

"The Church's liturgical action is designed to make us Christian. We are 'formed by the Liturgy' so that as Christians we may act like Christians" (p. 29). Such a sentence is typical of the theme of the book. The Church's liturgical life is today finding revival in all parts of our divided Christendom. The insights freshly brought to light by the liturgical movements in the Roman Church and in Protestantism are hailed by the author. "No more important fact has been visible in the Church's life in recent years. Even in admittedly 'Catholic' circles, where the notion of the social expression of Christian faith would naturally be central, there was only the idea of the Church as a mechanical, formal, and even static unity" (p. 5). "Today we find a very different notion of the Christian Church entertained by men everywhere. The conception of the Church as a living fellowship of loving souls, united in their Lord as their Head, finding their enriching source of life in membership in a body which is Christ's Body, receiving their enabling strength from him through the *Una Sancta*, has become the dominant view of the nature of the Church" (p. 6).

The significance of these rediscoveries in the meaning of common life in the Body of Christ for reunion can scarcely be overestimated. I consciously set myself, for example, the trial task of reading this book as if I were a member of one of our contemporary Protestant communions. Only a phrase here and there would jar such a reader. Certain problems in the areas of ministry and sacraments would still fail of resolution, but the recovery of the note of corporateness, of priesthood as representative of the Body of Christ as itself a priest-

hood, of sacrifice as including the offering of the Church itself—all these insights constitute bridges between Catholic and Evangelical concepts of the Church. Ecumenical theology needs to start where this author starts—with the worship life of the Christian people of God. Great days lie ahead.

The booklet tempts to quotation in place of comment. This reviewer cannot commend too highly, for example, such a paragraph as the following. Were the understanding of eucharistic worship of all Christian people penetrated by its wisdom, a revival of the Church from within would be inevitable. The author has been wrestling with the phrase "in Christ," which St. Paul uses so frequently, and which needs to be related to the equally familiar Pauline concept of the Church as the Body of Christ. He then continues: "When the two are so related, we discover that what St. Paul is in fact saying is that to be 'in Christ' is to be 'a member of his Body'; to be 'a member of his Body' is to be 'in Christ.' The two are one and the same thing, seen from different angles. That is why, for example, he can remark (in a much misunderstood verse, I Corinthians 11: 29) that if we eat the sacramental meal of the Christian fellowship without 'discerning the Lord's Body,' we eat and drink 'damnation' to ourselves. For what St. Paul means is that those who partake of the Eucharist without recognizing the Lord's Body 'which is the Church,' without sharing the social 'spread' of the Christian faith in intimate inter-relatedness with the other members of the Body of Christ, are killing their own very participation in the life of Christ himself, because that intimate inter-relatedness is to be 'in Christ' who is the life of the fellowship shared in his sacramental body."

THEODORE O. WEDEL

College of Preachers

The Commentary of Levi Ben Gershom (Gersonides) on the Book of Job. Translated from the Hebrew, with introduction and notes by Abraham L. Lassen. New York: Bloch, 1946, pp. xxii + 266. \$3.00.

By every test, the commentary of Gersonides on the Book of Job is excellent. Even with its scholastic stamp of the middle ages, the book is rich, useful, admirable in interpretation of the problems in Job. Antiquated reasoning or illustrations (in places) cannot

detract from its reading pleasure and current understanding.

The book is indispensable to any intensive study of Job. As a commentary, it has few rivals, and any superior would be difficult to name. The thought-idiom is mediaeval, based upon a study of a most ancient book; but the ideas and thinking are universal and contemporary. The Book of Job requires a good commentary for its mastery and comprehension. Gersonides has written one of the ablest and best companions to Job.

Rabbi Lassen has performed a scholarly and successful work. This is the first English translation of this long commentary. An accurate and fluent translation it is. Citations to Aristotle and others are clearly given. The brief English introduction is to the point. Super-commentaries and footnotes are omitted. Thus, the text is Gersonides himself, in English, with all fidelity and felicity.

Levi ben Gershom (1288 to about 1344) is an honored name in Hebrew literature and philosophy, where he is sometimes known as Ralbag or Gersonides. A native of France, a master of learning, at home in science and philosophy and theology, Aristotelian in outlook as modified by Arabic and Neo-Platonic concepts, Gersonides is honored and neglected. Few of his writings have been published independently. What is found of him in the private libraries is in fine type among other commentators.

To illustrate the exceeding merit of the commentary, a few sentences from chapter 28 may be quoted. "Where shall wisdom be found? and what is the place of understanding?" has seemed to some commentators an interlude which interrupts the continuity of Job. Gersonides regards that chapter as essential in the development of the thought. So he writes:

"When Job saw that none of his friends made reply to him, he . . . said: As God liveth, even He has taken away my right. . . . Or it may mean: if your assertion that good and evil befall men by His judgment in accordance with their deeds is true, as God liveth, it is He who hath taken away my right. As the Almighty liveth, I declare that it is He who embittered my soul, for as long as my life lasts, my lips will not utter iniquity and falsehood by confessing the truth of your words. . . .

"In continuing his discourse [ch. 28] Job explains the reason which compelled him to adopt the view that evils may befall at times the righteous and the wicked alike and says as follows: We see that all matters which are found in this sublunar world are limited and determined. Thus it happens at times that in some place of the earth, silver is found . . . and gold . . . and iron. . . . If such be the case, namely, that there is an end and limit to all material things, it is evident then that prosperity in all these material acquisitions is not real happiness, for they will be destroyed when the time comes, and in this matter the righteous and the wicked are alike. But since the righteous may possess, in addition . . . real happiness, that is of the soul which the wicked do not have, it is therefore evident that I prefer the righteous to the impious. . . .

"And whence does wisdom emanate? . . . All this is said by Job in order to convey to us the thought, namely, that sense experience alone is not sufficient for the acquisition of wisdom, an opinion which is also expressed by Aristotle. . . ."

DAVID B. ALPERT

Boston, Mass.

Light from the Ancient Past: The Archeological Background of the Hebrew-Christian Religion. By Jack Finegan. Princeton University Press, 1946, pp. xxxiv + 500. \$5.00.

Recent years have seen the appearance of several valuable manuals of Old Testament archaeology; e.g., Millar Burrows' *What Mean These Stones?*, which is organized topically, and C. C. McCown's *The Ladder of Progress in Palestine*, which deals separately with several sites. Professor Finegan has given us one which takes in all the more important areas and is arranged, so far as possible, in chronological order and which prefaces each section with a clear, succinct summary of the known history. Moreover, his book does not stop with the pre-Christian era. Nearly half of it is devoted to the archaeology of New Testament times and the early Church.

Mr. Finegan has thus filled a gap which too long has been unfilled. Those who were interested in New Testament archaeology and could not read French, German or Italian were forced to depend largely on the imperfect work

of C. M. Coburn, summaries of part of the field such as Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East*, articles in the *Biblical Archaeologist*, summaries such as Willoughby's in the *Festschrift* for Case, and the publications of the Dura-Europos and other excavations, which are not to be found in all libraries. Protestant scholars have largely neglected this side of archaeology, and this includes Anglicans, save for an occasional writer like the unique and irreplaceable Walter Lowrie. Professor Finegan has now provided what amounts to a syllabus for beginners. With it one may begin to collect information about the sites of early Christianity, the papyri and other remains, the ancient churches of Jerash, Bethlehem, Constantinople and Rome, and so on. With its clear, handsome print, its convenient format, and its magnificent plates, what a fine job it is! And, while it is not in any way controlled by theological prejudices, it is written in such a way as to be acceptable to both liberal and conservative Protestants and also to Roman Catholics. Teachers and students will use this book with profit and pleasure for many years to come.

The author, who is professor in Iowa State College at Ames, is thoroughly competent to undertake such a task. Previously he has been known to the learned world as author of one of the *Beihefte* of the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*. For a number of years he was a pupil of Professor Hans Lietzmann of Berlin, and there were few who had the knowledge of early Christian archaeology which this great historian possessed. Mr. Finegan must have been largely dependent upon secondary materials for the first part of his book, but he has used them well; and in much of the latter portion he has no doubt investigated the sources first-hand.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

Episcopal Theological School

The First Epistle of St. Peter. By Edward Gordon Selwyn. London: Macmillan, 1946, pp. xvi + 517. \$6.00.

The Macmillan series of commentaries began eighty-one years ago with the publication of Lightfoot's *Galatians*. Through the years there have been added such standard works as Armitage Robinson on Ephesians, McNeile on Matthew, and Creed on Luke. The tradi-

tion has been honorably continued by the Dean of Winchester. I Peter, one of the most edifying of all New Testament books, has at last been provided with an adequate commentary in English. Hort's book carried the exegesis only as far as 2: 17. Bigg's contribution to the International Critical Commentary was neither so extensive nor so intensive; and it is now out of date.

Dr. Selwyn's scholarship is of a kind which is very rare in this country. In the first place, he is a thorough Hellenist who brings to the task not merely a thorough knowledge of *koine* Greek but a memory steeped in the classics. Secondly, he has been at pains to acquaint himself with some of the most important German and American literature on his subject, though it must also be said that he has missed some worth-while items. Thirdly, he does more than to set down the bare facts; he seeks continually to draw out from the biblical book the theological insights and practical edification which he considers pertinent. His encyclopaedic knowledge of Christian literature—comparable to that of the late James Moffatt—is shown by the numerous references to Latin hymns, Piers Plowman, Shakespeare, Luther, John and Charles Wesley, and reports from modern mission fields, as well as the inevitable Greek and Jewish writings. The volume includes 115 pages of introduction, 123 of exegesis, 65 of additional notes, two essays, on I Pet. 3: 18-4: 6 and on the inter-relation of I Peter with other epistles, an appended note on the imperative participle prepared by Dr. David Daube, and indexes. All parts of the book are compactly written, rich with learning, touched with imagination.

The book is very English, and very Anglican, in more ways than one. The Dean is conscious of the work of the *Religionsgeschichtliche* school, but he is not impressed by its conclusions. One has the impression that he thinks almost the only influences at work in first century Christianity were Judaism and the primitive Christian message; our religion was only in external relationship with Graeco-Roman culture and absorbed none of its spiritual patterns. Dr. Selwyn seems to have little consciousness that there were conflict and development in the apostolic and post-apostolic periods: the message of the Catholic and Pastoral epistles developed peacefully out of

the earlier catechisms and forms of teaching, and Christianity was to all intents and purposes a mature religion by the time the Jewish War broke out. Perhaps this is partly due to his preoccupation with I Peter, one of the most irenic and winsome of all New Testament books. It is also due to his view of the origins of Christianity. By dating I Peter in 63 or 64 and assigning it to the apostle whose name it bears, he necessarily assumes that the development requires only a single generation. Peter and Paul therefore speak much the same language, as they do in Acts. This interpretation of Christian beginnings by no means controls his exegesis, which is as independent of theological bias as it can be, but it does affect his view of the epistle as a whole and its place in the history of early Christianity. If his introduction to I Peter is correct, it must follow that Ephesians is genuine, that there is no real doubt about Colossians, and that the Pastoral Epistles are actually not very un-Pauline.

Dr. Selwyn of course agrees that the elegant Greek of I Peter was beyond the powers of the Apostle. His solution is that, while the teaching and plan of the work were St. Peter's, Silvanus actually drafted it for him, and he bases this on a number of similarities between I Peter and the Thessalonian letters, of which Silvanus was (apparently) the amanuensis. The Dean denies that the teaching of I Peter is based on the Pauline epistles; instead, both Paul and Peter draw on a corpus of moral teaching which early assumed a definite form and was generally accepted and used by Christian teachers. This part of the argument is very carefully worked out by means of form-critical methods, and Dr. Selwyn has carried one stage further the results of Archbishop Carrington's *The Primitive Christian Catechism*.

The Silvanus hypothesis, while it deserves the most careful consideration, is open to serious difficulties. The Thessalonian letters and I Peter are documents of very different kinds, and the style is by no means the same. Other hypotheses will account equally well for the similarities. On the other hand, the case for a primitive catechism has been greatly strengthened; and in view of Martin Werner's work on the Gospel of Mark, one should not expect that every parallel to Paul's teaching is due

to his influence. But this does not establish the case for Petrine authorship. What it does is to add to our knowledge of the post-apostolic age: I Peter brings into the later literature a new note by emphasizing, not merely the words of Christ and the accepted patterns of moral teaching, but the example of Jesus' human life.

Within the space of a review it is impossible to give more than two examples of the exegesis. The famous passage 3: 18-22 is taken to be independent of 4: 6. It does not refer to the dead saints of the past. The "spirits in prison" are instead the archetypal spirits of evil whose rebellion led to the world's wickedness and thus to the Flood. 2: 6 is rendered "That is why it says in the hymn," and the following verses are considered as an example of catechetical and liturgical material.

Enough has been said so that one may realize the many new avenues of study which Dr. Selwyn has opened up. One comes away from the commentary reassured by the progress of research in England and stimulated to investigate many fascinating problems for oneself.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

Episcopal Theological School

Studies and Documents edited by Kirsopp and Silva Lake, XIV. The De Incarnatione of Athanasius. Part 1. The Long Recension Manuscripts. By George J. Ryan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945, pp. xii + 125. \$4.00.

This study is the first of two parts of a work which will deal with both recensions of the manuscripts of Athanasius' apologetic argument for the Incarnation. As F. L. Cross has suggested in his recent inaugural lecture at Oxford, perhaps the two recensions were not circulated in Athanasius' lifetime, and were derived from his papers after his death (compare Ryan's remarks on pp. 26 f.). Interest in Athanasius is at present increased by the fact that the Berlin Academy edition of his writings is (or was) under way. Ryan presents cogent reasons for disagreeing with the Berlin editor's classification of the manuscripts on the basis of the contents of the various Athanasian corpora. "In the present study the relationship of the manuscripts has

been determined by collation and comparison of the variants of the *De Incarnatione*" (p. 18); and the results of this work lead Ryan to conclude that "all the extant Long Recension manuscripts of the *De Incarnatione* are descendants of two lost archetypes . . . α and β " (p. 28); " β is, on the whole, a somewhat less trustworthy witness than is α to their common source" (p. 50). He maintains "the integrity and high value of S" (p. 88), the twelfth-century Codex Seguerianus, which Robertson used for his second edition of 1893, but did not correctly copy (p. 4, n. 15). It is worth noting that in the third edition of 1901, which Ryan does not mention, only one (p. 34: 4) of his twenty mistakes is corrected. For some reason Robertson's text, rather than the text of S, will be reproduced in Part 2 of these studies.

It is of course not a book which the ordinary reader will find interesting, although to anyone at all interested in textual criticism it will prove fascinating, and every theological or classical library or student of Athanasius should acquire it. The Lakes are to be congratulated on the continuing merit of their series.

ROBERT M. GRANT

University of the South

Religion in Russia. By Robert Pierce Casey. New York. Harpers, 1946, pp. viii + 198. \$2.00.

By reason of its objectivity and comprehensive coverage, this is among the most satisfactory books in its field. In his first two chapters Dr. Casey considers the spiritual bondage of the Orthodox Church in Tsarist times, particularly from Peter the Great and the supplanting of the old Patriarchate by the Holy Governing Synod with its frank Erastianism copied from Lutheran and Anglican models; then the position and disabilities of dissenting groups, Roman, Western Protestant, and the indigenous sects which Russia has produced to profusely. He next analyzes and illustrates the anti-religious philosophy of Marxism and its disciples among Russian revolutionaries. These two factors—and neither of them apart from the other—explain the Bolshevik attack upon religion in general and Orthodoxy in particular. The modifications of Soviet policy in relation to religion

and Church are clearly and succinctly traced. The impact of German aggression united the Russian people, Christian and atheist, in a common patriotic task against the invader. The Church's contribution to national welfare was met by a relaxation of the Soviet's anti-religious propaganda. The restored Patriarchate has sought to "integrate Christianity with Soviet patriotism," and "Holy Russia" lives again. If the Roman Church does not benefit from this change of policy it is because that Church has persisted in political action in utter disdain of compromise and bitter denunciation of the philosophy of communism.

This, in sum, is the theme of the book. But no brief summary can indicate the very real insights herein contained, nor can it give even a hint of the apt illustrative material in prose and verse (including some fascinating folk-poetry of the revolution) which Dr. Casey has happily translated.

The author, Professor of Religion at Brown and a priest of the Episcopal Church, prepared the book for initial delivery as Lowell Institute lectures in Boston a year ago. Here and there his Churchman's interest in Anglican-Orthodox relations comes out, but never particularly obtrusively. It may be a slip that Athelstan Riley is misprinted *Athelston*; but this hardly accounts for James Mason Neale (in three places).

PERCY V. NORWOOD

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

Men and Movements in the American Episcopal Church. By E. Clowes Chorley. New York: Scribners, 1946, pp. x + 501. \$4.00.

Dr. Chorley, the historiographer of the Episcopal Church, for ten years has been gathering and sifting material to trace the story of the strife between the ecclesiastical parties of this Church, the one movement that has been really divisive in the 160 years of its existence. There may have been differences of opinion in the principles and policies at stake in other movements that were the concern of the Church from time to time, but none engendered the heat and tensions caused by the differences in the points of view concerning the nature and functions of the church. And none has perpetuated the divergent emphases that have characterized this contention about the Church itself. In the final chapter

Dr. Chorley suggests, without much documentation, but we believe truly, that due to the shifting of ground in the last generation the two most representative parties on either side of the controversy are drawing closer together. That an historian should depart from the dispassionate presentation of factual material and present a generalization of this nature indicates his feeling as to the effect on the life of the Church of this strife he has recorded. The implication is that when the energy expended on strife within can once again be utilized in a united witness to the foes without a new day will have dawned for this Church so passionately loved by all her children.

The author sets about his task by tracing the nature of church life which gradually emerged in the revolutionary and subsequent period. The dominant characteristic of these years was an evangelicalism which had sufficient robustness to revitalize and save for the future an otherwise moribund Church. For years there was no other emphasis, no other contending party. Evangelicalism was practically all there was. Godly men like Jarratt, Meade, Griswold and White were preaching the gospel of justification and sanctification and calling men to Christ. Practically the first intimation that evangelicalism with its emphasis on scripture as the sole rule of faith, the depravity of man, justification by faith and the direct appeal to Jesus without ministerial intervention did not represent the point of view of all was found in the vigorous championship by Bishop Hobart in 1811 of another emphasis. In many respects he was the first vocal High Churchman. But because it is the point of departure for the subsequent controversy Dr. Chorley treats in detail the development of the Evangelical Movement first, carrying it up to about the middle of the century, and weaves the story about such stalwarts as Tyng, Clark, McIlvaine, Moore, Chase and Eastburn.

In accordance with the purpose of the author only to tell the story of the controversies of churchmanship, the bulk of the book is devoted to the growth of the High Church movement, which he finds latent in the tradition of Connecticut but which becomes conscious of itself as a movement under the positive leadership of Bishop Hobart.

Dr. Chorley sees three stages in its growth. First there were the early High Churchmen

represented by such men as Seabury, Hobart, Brownell, Onderdonk and De Lancey. Their emphasis was on what they deemed neglected elements in the Church life of the day, the Church itself, the sacraments, and the apostolic ministry. The Tractarian movement, which had a profound influence in America, set the stage for the next development, which Dr. Chorley calls the Early Catholic Movement. Prominent in this phase of its development were the bishops Doane, Kemper, Whittingham, Cobb, Ives (who eventually withdrew to Rome) and the presbyters Crosswell, Breck, Muhlenberg and Hoffman. The emphasis in this epoch was on apostolic succession, a sacerdotal priesthood, the real presence in the Eucharist, private confession and private absolution (p. 228). The third stage is called the Anglo-Catholic Movement, which is characterized by a "full catholicism," with a larger emphasis on the doctrine of the real presence, non-communicating attendance, fasting communions, reservation for adoration and prayers for the departed (p. 316). The men who formed the spearhead for this development were the bishops Grafton and Webb, and the presbyters Ewer, Ritchie, De Koven, and Percival. This stage was accompanied by a great growth in ritualistic practices which became the focal points of attack.

With the passage of the years the Evangelicals, as Dr. Chorley pictures it, had broken into groups, one of which was the Broad Church group composed of men like Brooks, Vinton, Thomas M. Clark and Greer, whose major interests were not in ecclesiastical controversy, and the Low Churchmen, who in controversy were radically polemic. A fraction of this group, despairing at the apparently irremediable state of affairs, was led out of the Church by Bishop Cummins.

The history of the controversy is ended at this point rather abruptly, with the detailed story of the last sixty years to be told at another time. The first sixty years, however, are adequately and admirably covered with a wealth of documentary reference.

A few minor criticisms suggest themselves. Since it is evident that Dr. Chorley aims only to give an account of the growth of the ecclesiastical parties in the Episcopal Church the title seems to be too comprehensive. Again, because of the method employed of having the action center in personalities there is much

retracing of steps. This makes it difficult, for those whose knowledge of the field is slight, to follow the sequence of events. One feels also that a fuller treatment of the Broad Church movement would have been advantageous. On the other hand since a fairly high degree of impartiality has been attained the book will find a permanent place among trustworthy historical material. The index will be of great assistance to students and the bibliography of 29 pages is indispensable.

HENRY H. SHIRES

Church Divinity School of the Pacific

A History of the Diocese of Albany, 1704-1923. By George E. DeMille. Philadelphia: Church Historical Society, 1946, pp. xii + 151. \$2.50.

This is a good piece of work. Not only does it show painstaking and competent investigation of a vast amount of documentary evidence; it also shows an imaginative grasp of the motives and convictions which characterized a group with force sufficient to create, in an unwelcoming environment, a diocese which grew and prospered and inspired respect. What Ralph Adams Cram once said of architecture, that it is "a realization of the idea in terms of the necessity," is true of life generally. We have too much writing of history by those who see only the necessity and ignore the transforming force of the idea; Mr. DeMille is not that kind of an historian.

In his book one sees the Indian wilderness, the contending and exploiting whites, the beginnings of the Episcopal Church in north-eastern New York (under the Barclays, father and son, Sir William Johnson, and the rest) resistant to the predatory greeds which hid behind the skirts of Puritanism; one observes, after the Revolutionary eclipse, the rebuilding under Ellison and Father Nash and Philander Chase and others who, like them, were willing to contend against the bigotries and superficialities of the Protestantism of that day; one looks with renewed and deepened admiration on John Henry Hobart and Horatio Potter and Bishop Doane. These men knew the idea of a free Catholicism, untied either to an authoritarian Rome or to the emotionalized morality which animated the popular religions round about; they were the proponents of that

free Catholicism and sought to be its embodiment. That for which they stood and which they preached was contrary to the *mores* of their day. They aimed not at the mob but at those—often quite simple people—whose perception of religious values was beyond the vision of the mob. The early churches of the Albany district were aristocratic churches, not aristocratic in terms of money (they were desperately poor, most of these ventures), but rather aristocratic in resistance to a dragging down of the Church of God to the level of a human social club. Because of this they mattered, they exercised an influence far beyond what their numbers seemed to indicate as probable.

All this is plain as one reads on in this book from one well-documented fact to another. The author does not point out the moral; he does not need to do that. There is an admirable restraint from preaching in this book.

What is not apparent, however, is any indication of why this adventure, so marked by sound principle and missionary zeal, subsided in the 1890's into just another typical denomination. It has not been because Bishops Nelson and Oldham have been men of small stature, or lacking in courage. Mr. DeMille makes that plain; but he indicates no true reason for the loss of force. His analysis grows thin when he comes to 1900; even his documentation gets meagre; obviously he takes small joy in Albany's twentieth century. Has the decreasing influence been due to an increasing wealth unready to analyze the source of its affluence, or to the development of class-conscious respectability, or perhaps to indifference to that idea of Anglo-Catholicism which inspired its fathers; or has it been the local reflection of a general let-down in America in realization of the superiority of devotion to principles over expediency? Is the lassitude permanent or will there be recovery? Mr. DeMille is writing history; he rightly leaves prophecy alone. But it must be noted that he is wrong in calling his book a *History of the Diocese of Albany, 1704-1923*. The history is only through Bishop Doane's episcopate, and even the latter part of that episcopate is not well done.

BERNARD IDDINGS BELL

Chicago, Ill.

Discerning the Signs of the Times. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Scribners, 1946, pp. xii + 194. \$2.50.

In his characteristic and provocative manner, Reinhold Niebuhr has given us another volume setting forth the dominant themes of the Christian faith and their special relevance to our times. The book is subtitled *Sermons for Today and Tomorrow* and was based upon sermons actually preached in American colleges and universities. In fact, however, it is a collection of sermonic essays.

The continuous thread running throughout the series is "the relation of the historical to the trans-historical elements of the Christian faith." The Christian community believes in the realization of God's will in human history but at the same time it asserts that "the Christian hope transcends the limits of history as we know it."

The second sermon, on Anger and Forgiveness, was of somewhat special interest to the reviewer because of its unusual insight into the fact that anger may be the root of either righteousness or sin. Too long has it been assumed without critical examination that anger is inevitably sinful. The modern understanding of anger given to us by "depth-psychology," as an integral component of human personality, has yet to be creatively related to Christian theology, e.g. to the doctrine of grace, or to the Christian ethic. The "outlawing" of anger by Christian thought has been as hypocritical and destructive of personality as the so-called "Victorian" sex prudishness. The mechanism of repression has been as rigid and extensive in the case of anger as was, and still is, for the most part, the case with the erotic impulses. While some progress has been made in seeing the significance of the latter for the Christian ethic the former emotion has been almost entirely ignored. To quote the author, "We must learn the difficult art of being angry without sinning."

As one might expect in a collection of this sort there is considerable repetition not only of thought, phrases, and words but even of major themes. This does not seem to weaken the impact of the book, however.

The author's profound insight into the central mystery of Christianity is expressed beautifully by Sermon VIII, The Power and the Weakness of God. And his political and

theological realism is set forth typically in Sermon III, The Age Between the Ages (to the readers of Barth and Brunner, a not unfamiliar phrase).

ALDEN DREW KELLEY

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

Plato's Theory of Man. By John Wild. Harvard Univ. Press, 1946, pp. x + 320. \$5.00.

This magnificent study is one that should not be overlooked by the student of Anglican theology. Plato has a special importance for Anglicans. There is a story of the late Abp. Temple which illustrates this. At one of the ecumenical meetings, a continental theologian was complaining that Anglicans, unlike Lutherans, Calvinists, and others, have no fixed theology, founded by and expounded in the writings of some one great theologian. "Who is the founder of Anglican theology?" he asked. Without hesitating the Archbishop replied, "Plato." There is, as Dean Inge has insisted and as anyone familiar with the subject will recognize, a "Platonic tradition" in English religious thought. The late Dean Ladd of Berkeley proposed that in an ideal theological college, Plato's *Republic* should be the subject of the first year of study in systematics, somewhat as Scottish students begin (or used to begin) with Hume's *Dialogues*—and try to answer them. It would be well if all theological students also read Professor Wild's book.

For Plato, contrary to the popular estimate, was not an "idealist"—this is one thesis that underlies the whole book. On the contrary, "Aristotle is a speculative theorist, Plato a practical philosopher" (p. 11); though—and this is another thesis, amply demonstrated—Plato and Aristotle are not to be set in opposition, as if Aristotle were the critic and opponent who had outgrown and discarded Plato's "idealism" for something more positive and "scientific." It is strange how widespread this antiquated and superficial view still continues to be: there are now scholars aplenty who repudiate it: e.g., J. L. Stocks in his little book on *Aristotelianism*, 1925. Instead, the whole tradition of classical philosophy was a more or less homogenous creation (except for such partial and onesided developments as Epicureanism, Skepticism, etc.), down to and including the Schoolmen (esp. Aquinas).

Further, as a practical philosopher, Plato was concerned with the philosophy of culture, and especially with education (*paideia*) and its opposite, as he says in so many words in the introduction to the myth of the Cave in Bk. VII (514 A) of the *Republic*, and repeatedly elsewhere. Plato's view of philosophy, like our Anglican view of theology, is practical, not speculative. It was addressed to a specific situation—the Greek world, and especially Athens, in the period following the Periclean age and during the long, disheartening aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The present day provides a similar state of affairs: modern idealism has broken down, and complete irrationalism in thought and the social reliance upon force (totalitarianism, either "socialistic" or "communistic") threaten to take its place. In theology we can see the effects of this already: natural theology, or reliance upon reason, is laughed out of court in some circles—as if the God of truth could be served by the abandonment and renunciation of human reason! It is against this modern tendency, in philosophy, theology, and social thinking, that Professor Wild shows Plato to be still a stronghold of defense. And if anyone supposes that the book before us is a dry dissertation on one aspect of Plato's thought, he has another guess coming: this is the whole Plato, wrestling with the central problem of human life, and with "still more light to break forth" from his pages. The relevance of Plato to the modern scene is illustrated in a hundred ways. It makes one think of the relevance of the Bible, illustrated by Rowland Hilder's pictures (post-Munich!) in the edition recently published by Oxf. U. Pr. Especially for the present-day overhauling of education here in America, the relevance of Plato is manifest throughout.

The main content of the book is an exposition of Plato's philosophy of culture as set forth in the *Republic*, but with ample illustration from the other dialogues: these chh. (2-5) are almost a companion to the *Republic*. First the arts and their "inversion" are studied, then social life and its "deformation," then that of the individual. Ch. 5 is a study of the image of the Cave—the way upward and backward from the inversion or perversion of culture or education, through the four stages of the growth of philosophic intelligence: sensa-

tion, opinion, knowledge, insight. This chapter, especially, is a classic exposition of the terms Plato uses, and their connotations for his system as a whole. (Incidentally, Professor Wild's fresh translation of Plato's language is most illuminating: one heartily wishes that the book had an index of Greek words! Jowett's translation is dismissed as inaccurate, in more than one passage, and also as a whole, since it misrepresents Plato's usual style. The difficulty is, however, Plato often *does* write like Jowett, especially in his religious passages, where a golden haze floods the entire landscape! Wild evidently shares the view of Taine and Shorey, that Plato "would shock us if we saw him as he is" [qu. by Shorey, *Rep.*, L.C.L., Vol. II, Int., ad fin.]. He does not, however, indulge in the racy, not to say (in one or two spots) slangy, type of translation Professor Shorey gave us, in his reaction against Jowett and the older English translators.) Following these chapters, in which the *Republic* is central, comes an exposition of the *Parmenides* ("Being and Its Inversion"), *Theaetetus* ("The Inversion of the Apprehensive Faculties"), and finally the *Sophist*—who is the *bête noire*, the devil in the dark, the counterfoil and horrible example of all that is bad, the consummate expression of opposition to and perversion of the truth as set forth in Plato's system, the evil genius who (in N. T. language) "turns God's truth into a lie." This last chapter is very difficult to read: but it is clear at least that the intellectual and moral perversities of the sophist are still with us—not only in high politics and in the leading astray of whole nations in our day, but in every one of us, all the time. We all share his stupidities and insincerities, for there is something of the sophist in every man.

So Professor Wild's book as a whole is no mere academic exercise in searching out and writing up one obscure phase of Plato's thought: it is a flaming manifesto, for those who take seriously the impasse at which modern philosophy and social idealism have arrived, and who are eager to find a way out, around, or—back. Plato was no "idealist," but a hard-headed realist and rationalist: on the other hand he was anything but a materialist or a naturalist. He trusted reason, to the very end. How then did so much "mysticism" get attached to him, in the late classical period?

But the question itself needs to be examined. If modern studies are reliable, Plotinus himself, the "second Plato," was a rationalist, and carried reason along with him—or was borne along by it—up to the very threshold of the Beatific Vision, i.e. the union with the One: he was a Greek, and an intellectual, all the way. So were the Schoolmen, i.e. "the greatest of them. Indeed, thanks to the Arab tradition of Aristotle, with their immense reliance on logic (the same hard brilliance of mind which Doughty noted in the Preface to *Arabia Deserta*), western theology got even an overdose of rationality in the 13th century. Plato is not that rigid: but he is certainly looking in their direction." And the way out, for theology, is not by an even sharper refining of terms and an ever stricter logic in their use, but by a return to the practical, comprehensive, realistic (in the earlier sense) study of human life and its problems in the light of the great principles set forth not only in the Gospel but also, in large measure, in Plato. There is still no better school for careful, accurate thinking about the problems of life than that set up by Plato. The theologian (as well as the philosopher) may well take to heart what is said on p. 34:

"The *Summa Theologica* is basically a practical order, including, as it must, a complete theoretical order. Beginning with God, the final end, it then examines the nature of the creature, finally that of man. Then it carefully describes the twofold pathway, first, in outline, the natural, then in more detail the supernatural, by which man may move back practically to his source and end. The decadent scholastics of the late Middle Ages failed to recapture the primary insights of Plato and Aristotle. They repeated the phrases of the great Thomistic synthesis without fully understanding them, or relating them to the actual, cultural matrix which is their essential starting point. Hence this synthesis, and philosophy itself, fell into neglect and disrepute.

Recent Aristotelian studies have revived the theoretical portions of this synthesis. The theological portions of the synthesis persist behind rigid ecclesiastical barriers. But before the synthesis as a whole can be revived, and philosophy can once again be made to live in our schools, and most of all in our minds and hearts, we must revive the explicit and implicit cultural philosophy of this synthesis and recognize the guidance it offers for the practical natural aspirations of man. This phase of our western philosophy has its roots in Plato."

What Plato said about religion, in the *Euthyphro*, is also of practical import—and

its very practical importance leads to the demand for a sounder theory:

"Religion can be protected against these distortions only by the philosophic understanding, which purifies the sacred myths and practices of tradition, restoring them to that supreme and culminating position from which human ignorance (*amathia*) and pride (*hubris*) are constantly seeking to remove them for their own ends, and thus to reduce them to forms of quackery (*kolakeia*). Hence in the *Euthyphro*, Socrates attempts to reason with a "religious" fanatic who has uncritically accepted many of the current myths and magical formulae, and in the *Republic* [364 B 12 ff.] he has only scorn for "those mendicant priests and seers" who peddle protective charms and incantations. The upshot of such criticism is not so much to substitute other opinions and theories, "to make up new Gods" [*Euth.*, 5 A 7], as to make men aware of their own ignorance in such matters, and to bring them face to face with the truly mysterious but undeniable fact of "the holy" (*to hosion*)" [pp. 74 ff.].

There are many other quotable passages, esp. those dealing with education, social control, political theory, and statecraft (e.g., pp. 85, 104, 107 f., 111, 117, 120, 141, 170, 189, 204, 254). But I have been looking at the book solely from the view-point of theology, not of philosophy or sociology. At that, there are still others I wish I had space to quote: on theology and philosophy (pp. 78, 109, 230); on Erôs (152; it is something profounder, and better, than much of our now popular theology, following Anders Nygren, would lead us to think); on Plato's "aristoeracy," really a theocracy (111; cf. 108); against the fantastic notion that Plato teaches Fascism (116); on dialectic (32; om. in Index); on Church and State (122); on the importance of the two parables (of the sun and of the divided line) for the myth of the Cave with its four stages (ch. 5). But enough has been said to indicate the importance of the book, not only for students of philosophy but also, and especially, for students of theology.

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Empirical Philosophies of Religion. By James Alfred Martin, Jr. New York: King's Crown Press, 1945, pp. xii + 146. \$2.00.

It is evident that modern philosophies do not inevitably come to religious conclusions; it is also evident that modern religious thought does not easily become philosophical. Mr.

Martin's study is set in the context of the philosophical difficulties of religion, taking as its theme the problem of epistemology, and thereby attempting at once the most important and most difficult problem of the religious philosopher. Among the titles of current articles, the question, "Can the philosophy of religion become empirical?" is as often as not matched by the depressing query, "Is a philosophy of religion possible?" The questions are not unrelated.

Mr. Martin's book may be said to be much more than research of interest to specialists; it has significance for anyone concerned with the relation between religion and philosophy. Framed neatly between quotations from William James, who continues to be the alpha and omega for studies of religious experience, the efforts of five men to produce empirical philosophies of religion are set down in paraphrase, accompanied by critical appraisal. The men selected for analysis do not constitute a school, but rather, by the variety of the presuppositions they represent, are intended to demonstrate how widely the interest in empiricism has been felt. The author is concerned "to show, through a summary exposition of certain important types, some of the divergent patterns which recent empirical religious philosophies have followed" (p. 7). From Hocking ("objective idealist") to Wieman ("theistic naturalist") the preoccupation with religious experience is examined with two further purposes: to indicate the ambiguities of terminology, inconsistencies of method, and final retreat into non-empirical forms of thought, which afflict these philosophers, and thereby to give a rough estimate of the success of the empirical movement today; and, to use this history of failures, taken as it is impartially from idealisms and realisms, as an extended text for the thesis that an empirical philosophy of religion presents difficulties not yet fully understood and most certainly not yet solved.

Mr. Martin refers to his "summary exposition" of these five men: the reader is warned. Some previous acquaintance with their work is almost essential if one is to follow him. His work suggests the need for expansion, not only of the treatment of the philosophies, but also of the concluding suggestions in which a continuation study is sketched out.

He finds that each of the five men feels a responsibility to include, as data for the re-

ligious philosopher, elements of general, public experience. This forms the basis for their claims to be "empirical," yet each in some measure soon becomes less than empirical, in data, method, or both. Hocking explains the importance of our knowledge of nature by reference to concepts "rationalistic and subjectivistic rather than empirical" (p. 27). Brightman, centering his philosophy in the experience of personal consciousness, proceeds to the notion of a supreme value. "Is any such 'being', the ground of all experience, discoverable in experience?" (p. 49). Boodin, more rigorous in his epistemology, includes nevertheless the notion of a spiritual field, a "context which overlaps all other contexts" encountered in experience. Summarizing the departure from empiricism of these three he says, "But it seems that the basic common emphasis of all idealists is upon the significance of the idea of 'the whole'. All of them believe that it is possible to have empirical knowledge of the essential or definitive character of 'the whole' of experience or reality, and that such knowledge is of primary importance in 'explaining' or understanding the 'parts'... Thus, while they recognize in some measure the significance of plurality in experience and the tentativeness and openness which a genuine recognition of its temporal quality demands, they seem at the same time to retain at least the rationalistic ideal of a 'finished' view of reality" (p. 63).

Macintosh is not more successful in his realism than the idealists in retaining a strict empiricism, arriving at the proposition that values are perceptible facts. And Wieman, finding God in nature as an object of sensory perception, proceeds beyond empiricism in his more extended definitions.

Mr. Martin is interested in every deviation which these men make from common, objective experience; he is especially careful to note the occurrence of this when it is unnoticed, by the philosopher himself. In general he concludes: "The 'experience' to which our empirical philosophers of religion point in defending their views is a much more highly selective and subjectively-conditioned affair than is the broader and more neutral material immediately apparent to the more impartial and open-minded empirical investigator" (p. 116).

In the effort to be "empirical," the religious thinker attempts to cross the boundary which

divides special from general experience. At the end of his study, Mr. Martin notes that before this enterprise should be attempted, prior questions require attention. His five philosophers "devoted chief attention to the interpretation in metaphysical terms of the content of religious experience and belief, with too little attention to the role of symbolic form and historical association in the meaning and expression of such belief and practice" (pp. 126 f). Nevertheless, a sense of urgency oppresses the religious philosopher,—a feeling of responsibility to demonstrate at once

the relevance of religion to the whole body of secular knowledge, as well as to provide a widely available entry into the special form of experience which he finds valuable. These men have an importance for this effort which a larger study would find dominant. If they are to be censured for blurring the edge of the term "empiricism," Mr. Martin has delineated that fault with precision, and may have helped to shift the center of the argument toward more essential topics.

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NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Christian Pattern. By Hugh Stevenson Tigner. New York: Macmillan, 1946, pp. xii + 80. \$1.50.

Hugh Tigner is a young Congregational minister who writes easily and forcefully, and frequently, we presume, for publication. In this small book he writes on the common themes of Christian living in an interesting, thoughtful and rewarding manner. His purpose in writing these essays is to reveal the nature of the Christian gospel as it came to him by way of a definite religious experience, after ten years in the ministry. His discovery is that Christianity for him is a "pattern of living" in which the goal to be achieved is a transformation from a self-centered to a God-centered life, which transition he points out is difficult because of three factors that affect us all: (1), the fact that by nature we all set out on a self-centered basis; (2), the tendency to put one's ego on the throne of God; and (3), the universal reluctance to start moving from a passive faith to dynamic action. The fundamental elements of the Christian pattern as he develops it in the body of the book are worship, largely of the corporate sort without which Christianity actually would succumb; the cultivation of the spirit of thankfulness; the attainment of humility (which can come only by indirection); the elimination of pride; the attainment of a love of service through sacrificial living; and love motivation. The chapter on humility is easily the best of the essays, all of which however have something worthwhile to say about the problem of developing the Christian character. It is a handy book for the preacher to have around.

H. H. S.

World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New York: Harpers, 1945, pp. viii + 247. \$2.00.

This is another volume in the "Religion and Civilization" series. Though the lectures contained in it were delivered only last year, they seem strange and remote in the post-war recession from idealism. "Collaboration for World Order," "The Philosophy of World Order," "A Juristic Framework of World Order," so it goes for 250 pages—contributions from first class minds, lawyers, teachers, psychologists, philosophers, theologians—every one with a national reputation. John LaFarge, editor of *America*, writes for Roman Catholics; Louis Finkelstein and Mordecai Kaplan for the synagogue; Edgar Brightman, John Bennett, F. Ernest Johnson for Protestants. Few of them seemed to realize the "weight and the sin that doth so easily beset us." The book closes with these words:

"There lies before us our 'Promised Land.' We must beware the enticing visions of milk and honey, but we must not listen too intently to those who fear the giants in the land. Can we combine a great faith in God with a vast humility as we look upon ourselves?"

But the giants are here!

H. H. H.

The Peace that is Left. By Emile Cammaerts. New York: Harpers, 1945, pp. x + 150. \$2.00.

Emile Cammaerts is a Belgian poet, playwright and patriot, who since 1933 has occupied the chair of Belgian Studies at the Uni-

versity of London. In a previous work, *The Flower of Grass*, he told the story of how he came out of humanistic scepticism into Christianity. In this book he sets out to guide the feet of young men and women who fought the war into the way of peace. He does it in a fashion that only a man of deep devotion and consummate artistry could do.

He summarizes in masterly fashion what men are saying about the church in the new age but he does not leave the summary as a set of propositions. He puts it so that those who have to live with the problem may find help and strength. That problem, as he sees it, is a vicious circle. "It is the 'duty of the State' to create conditions favourable to Christian life, but since governments depend on public opinion, and since the number of active Christians is strictly limited, no state is likely to fulfil its duty. It is 'the function of religion to transform the hearts of men' so that a sound international order may be established, but since Christianity is too weak to exert this function, owing to the adverse conditions created by the modern world, it is not likely that the hearts of men will be transformed in this way . . . but the shortest way with the world is not necessarily the shortest way with God."

The clergy might learn from Cammaerts how to talk to the more earnest among the returned soldiers.

H. H. H.

The Gloria Psalter. By Shirley Carter Hughson. West Park, N. Y.: Holy Cross Press, 1946, pp. 93. \$1.25.

To people of mature devotional life *The Gloria Psalter* will come as a refreshing discovery and should prove fruitful both in method and content for Meditation. Each of the 150 psalms yields a threefold "glory"—a verse of praise to the Father, another to the Son and a third to the Holy Ghost. And it works! Without forcing!

H. H. H.

The Height of Life. By Frederick Ward Kates. Louisville: Cloister Press, 1946, pp. 59. \$0.40.

The author has brought thoughts of spiritual leaders of our day to bear on the interpretation of the Seven Last Words and thereby produced a little gem which those who have

to lead Good Friday devotions will find of considerable value.

H. H. H.

Collected Papers of Evelyn Underhill. Edited by Lucy Menzies. London: Longmans, Green, 1946, 240. \$2.75.

These papers were written between 1922 and 1937 but were not published in her previous collection, called *Mixed Pasture*, because most of them were at that time in print as pamphlets. As they are now all out of print, with one or two exceptions, they have just been made available to us in one volume.

Some have had circulation in this country, more particularly *What is Mysticism?* and *The Parish Priest and the Life of Prayer*, but others are not so well known here. It was a happy thought to offer them to Evelyn Underhill's readers in a more permanent form.

One is constantly impressed with the clarity of her style and her feeling for words. At the same time "she was essentially modern with a mind acutely sensitive to the currents of contemporary thought, and capable of understanding the mental climate of her age." In other words, she was a poet and philosopher as well as a mystic.

Especially to be mentioned are not only the two essays noted above but also the three concluding papers addressed to teachers.

There is included in the book a complete list of Evelyn Underhill's writings (a valuable reference guide) and a splendid introduction by Lumsden Barkway, Bishop of St. Andrew's. This prefatory section will be exceedingly helpful to the new reader in providing a key to an understanding of Evelyn Underhill's thought, personality, and greatness.

A. D. K.

Beneath the Surface. By Maxwell Berger. New York: Bloch, 1946, pp. xiv + 169. \$2.50.

A director of education attempts a harmony of the Pentateuch with science and philosophy. Evidently intended for young people, the book provides maps and tables.

Unnamed authorities are cited. Eight references are made in the text to the preface, without any visible connection. For all its wide reading, the book is unsatisfactory. The science is meagre, the learning is superficial. The book does not live up to its title.

D. B. A.

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